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HUMAN CAPITAL DISCRIMINATION, LAW FIRM
INEQUALITY, AND THE LIMITS OF TITLE VII
Kevin Woodsont
This Article advances the legal scholarship on workplace inequality through use
of evidence derived from interviews of a sample of black attorneys who have worked
in large, predominantly white law firms. It does so by calling attention to the manner
in which these firms operate as sites of human capital discrimination-patterns of
mistreatment that deprive many black associates of access to the substantive work
opportunities crucial to their professional development and career advancement.
This Article identifies the specific arrangements and practices within these firms that
facilitate human capital discrimination and describes the varied, often subtle harms
and burdens that they tend to inflict upon black attorneys.
The incidence of human capital discrimination and its deleterious effects are
obscured by the informal and fluid personnel arrangements that are prevalent in
large law firms. As a result, human capital discrimination falls almost entirely
outside of the coverage of Title VII, the restrictions of which are currently limited by
the adverse employment action doctrine. In recognition of this, this Article endorses
two sets of doctrinal reforms that would afford black attorneys greater protections
under Title VII and proposes a series of organizational reforms that law firms
committed to the pursuit of workplace equality should undertake, notwithstanding
the limits of employment discrimination law.
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INTRODUCTION
Persisting racial disparities in America's largest law firms have
generated a rich body of legal scholarship that has resulted in
illuminating insights concerning the difficulties of minority law
associates in predominantly white firms.1 Notwithstanding its
important contributions, this scholarship has devoted little empirical
attention to the day-to-day experiences and career trajectories of actual
minority associates within these firms.2 This lack of empiricism leaves
I See, e.g., Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System: Constructing a Bridge Between
Workplace Equity Theory & the Institutional Analyses of Bias in Corporate Law Firms, 30
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85 (2009); Luis J. Diaz & Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the
Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 947 (2011); Veronica Root, Retaining
Color, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575 (2014); Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the
Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755 (2006); Eli Wald, Biglaw Identity Capital: Pink and
Blue, Black and White, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2509 (2015); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the
Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins &
Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament]; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493
(1996) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins,
On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999) (book review)).
2 But see Kevin Woodson, Race and Rapport: Homophily and Racial Disadvantage in Large
Law Firms, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2557 (2015) [hereinafter Woodson, Race and Rapport] (using
interview data from attorney interviews in the context of discussing homophily); Darden, supra
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much of our current understanding of their experiences largely
speculative.
This Article addresses this gap in the literature by drawing
evidence from interviews of seventy-five black attorneys who have
worked as associates at major law firms around the country.3 Through
an assessment of the first-hand experiences of these attorneys, 4 this
Article identifies certain processes, behaviors, and organizational
arrangements that derail the careers of many black attorneys, thereby
sustaining and perpetuating racial inequality throughout the industry.
Specifically, this Article calls attention to the salience and impact of
"human capital discrimination," racially disparate access to high-quality
work opportunities crucial for associates' professional development and
career advancement. This deprivation of human capital-the
accumulated career experiences, knowledge, and skills that determine
associates' future career prospects-constitutes a pernicious form of
institutional discrimination. 5
Human capital discrimination is informal, incremental, and
inchoate in nature. It flows from the subtle mechanisms of employment
disadvantage emphasized in the recent "'structural turn' in
antidiscrimination scholarship."6 It is consistent with a large body of
scholarship on implicit and other forms of racial bias,7 and sociological
note 1 (interviewing very small sample of law firm attorneys concerning issues of racial
diversity).
3 For information about the methodological approaches used in developing this sample
and conducting these interviews, see infra Section II.A.
4 Although this Article focuses specifically on the experiences of black law firm associates,
the concept of human capital discrimination of course affects members of other marginalized
groups in various occupational contexts as well.
5 While human capital discrimination can occur because of racial biases, it also reflects the
tendency of socially similar people to gravitate toward and one another. See Woodson, Race
and Rapport, supra note 2 (discussing cultural homophily-based behavior as a source of
disadvantage for black law firm associates).
6 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing this body of work as "[the] 'structural turn' in
antidiscrimination scholarship"). The past two decades have seen an important conceptual shift
in antidiscrimination scholarship away from the traditional forms of employment acts and
harms toward a focus on more nuanced and complicated processes that drive racial and gender
inequality in contemporary occupational settings. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural
Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849
(2007); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460
(2001) (discussing how "manifestations of workplace bias are structural, relational, and
situational").
7 See, e.g., John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction,
82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002); Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and
Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 325 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006) (offering an overview
of the experimental research); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the
2016]
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research on the tendencies of individuals to favor others who share
certain social backgrounds and cultural interests.8 Human capital
discrimination does not occur through formal personnel decisions with
immediately tangible career harms, but rather through more subtle,
quotidian forms of disadvantage. Compared to the more obvious forms
of discrimination common in other labor markets,9 the actions and
incidents that produce patterns of human capital discrimination can
seem rather mundane. And yet these seemingly minor disparities can
cumulatively produce substantial disadvantages. Though a single
decision to provide a high-quality assignment to one junior associate
instead of her counterparts may not carry immediately observable
career consequences, if left unaddressed, such disparate treatment over
time can impact an associate's career decisively. Associate careers are
highly path-dependent in that associates' earliest experiences in these
firms structure their later access to the opportunities and support
necessary to thrive long-term. Given this path dependency in the
intensely competitive career ladders of large firms, even relatively minor
inequalities in access to early opportunities to develop human capital
can snowball into insurmountable deficits, contributing to broader
patterns of marginalization and exclusion. Such early discrepancies can
lead to greater job dissatisfaction for black associates, who get choice
assignments less often than their white counterparts, 10 as well as racial
disparities in objective employment outcomes such as promotions and
attrition. Understanding law firm inequality therefore requires a
reconceptualization of employment discrimination as a cumulative
process-a trajectory of inequality-rather than as a result of any one
discrete act. In calling attention to the problem of human capital
discrimination, this Article seeks to clarify the stakes involved in how
employers and courts address relatively minor forms of unequal
employment treatment.
This Article's discussion of human capital discrimination
underscores the limitations of Title VII in addressing systematic forms
Implicit Association Test: I1. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith
eds., 2012) (examining the potential role of implicit bias in contributing to racial inequality and
unjust legal outcomes in a number of doctrinal areas).
8 See LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: How ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS (2015);
Woodson, Race and Rapport, supra note 2; Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination,
12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 335 (2016) [hereinafter Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination].
9 See generally Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC.
181, 187 (2008) (describing a multitude of studies that found that black workers were subjected
to substantial hiring discrimination).
10 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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of racially disparate treatment that occur in large firms and other
employment settings. Human capital discrimination can derail
associates' careers long before it has any impact on the formal terms and
conditions of their employment." Within law firms, dissatisfied black
associates voluntarily leave their firms before the effects of their limited
access to high-quality assignments have fully ripened. 12 As such, most
forms of human capital discrimination fall outside the parameters that
federal courts require before imposing employer liability under Title
VII. Due to the adverse employment action doctrine,13 Title VII liability
primarily extends to employment acts that directly affect the tangible
terms and conditions of a worker's employment.14 Despite their
disastrous career consequences for black attorneys, incidents of human
capital discrimination are frustratingly difficult to identify, let alone
trace, to tangible outcomes. Therefore, though differences in access to
substantive work responsibilities and on-the-job training can make or
break careers, they seldom are cognizable bases for Title VII claims.
These difficulties point to the need for ambitious doctrinal and
organizational reforms, on the part of courts and employers
respectively.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief history of
the experiences of black attorneys in large, predominantly white law
firms to demonstrate the systemic, stubborn racial disparities that
persist in these firms despite the profound progress of recent decades.
Part II examines the problem of human capital discrimination through
qualitative empirical evidence from interviews of a sample of black
attorneys. The first-hand reports of these interviewees add texture and
clarity to existing accounts of law firm inequality by describing the
causes, mechanisms, and consequences of human capital
discrimination. Part III provides an overview of the adverse
employment action doctrine of the existing Title VII case law and
explains how it excludes most instances of human capital discrimination
from coverage under the statute. 15 It then considers how organizational
11 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III. A notable exception is the hostile work environment doctrine, which
extends to workplace conduct that cumulatively renders workplace environments hostile or
abusive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (cause of action requires "severe
or pervasive enough [conduct] to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment").
15 This Article focuses specifically on disparate treatment theories of liability under Title
VII. Though associates can, in theory, challenge the practices that give rise to human capital
discrimination under disparate impact causes of action, this approach is beset by numerous,
formidable challenges. To pursue disparate impact claims, plaintiffs must prove that a specific
challenged employment practice has a disproportionate negative effect on the members of their
racial group. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1001-02 ("[T]he ultimate
burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
2016]
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features that are prevalent in large law firms render human capital
discrimination virtually impossible to address under the existing
jurisprudential framework. Part IV considers whether and how courts
and employers might more effectively address racial disparities in
associates' opportunities to develop human capital. It argues for a more
expansive notion of material adversity and even more comprehensive
doctrinal reforms, while acknowledging that legitimate practical
considerations limit their potential effectiveness. This Article concludes
by arguing that true progress can be achieved only through employers,
clients, and other interested industry constituents working
collaboratively to more effectively prevent and address human capital
discrimination, the formal legal process notwithstanding.
I. BLACK ATTORNEYS IN LARGE LAW FIRMS
A. From Complete Exclusion to Partial Inclusion
For more than 150 years after the founding of the first American
law firms,16 black attorneys faced uniform discrimination and near
complete exclusion from the profession. Through the early twentieth
century, very few black Americans were licensed to practice law.17 Those
who were licensed faced severely limited employment options and were
generally confined to working on matters representing other black
Americans.18 Black students were conspicuously absent from the highly
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." (citation omitted)). As an initial
matter, due to the small number of black attorneys employed by these firms, plaintiffs
attempting to sue law firms would struggle to amass the statistical evidence that courts prefer as
proof of disparate impact or to identify the specific employment practices responsible. See
generally Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Martfor
Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 443-44
(2012) (discussing burdensome "evidentiary rigors of a disparate impact claim"). Though
plaintiffs can challenge employers' discriminatory use of subjective practices in general, such
claims face considerable practical and evidentiary difficulties, and are seldom successful. See
Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle,
74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1236 n.8 (1999) ("Although it is theoretically possible to establish a disparate
impact claim based on subjective employment practices, such cases are both difficult and
rare."). These and other difficulties limit the plausibility of disparate impact theory as a means
of addressing human capital discrimination.
16 See Charles Delafuente, The Old One: Philly Firm's History Dates Back to Ben Franklin,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 2014 (the first American law firms were founded in the 1780s).
17 See Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49 (1935).
18 Harry T. Edwards, A New Role for the Black Law Graduate: A Reality or an Illusion?, 69
MICH. L. REV. 1407 (1971); Ernest Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J.
1069, 1070 (1968) ("White law firms, government, business and bar associations were closed to
the Negro. The Negro lawyer had to operate on the fringe of the profession."); William H. Hale,
The Negro Lawyer and His Clients, 13 PHYLON 57 (1952); Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Black Lawyers
Cannot Be Relegated to a Professional Ghetto, 7 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 57 (1981); William C. Kidder,
[Vol. 38:183
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selective law schools where the largest, most elite law firms focused their
associate hiring efforts. The few black law students who were able to
attend these schools were still denied employment in these firms, no
matter how impressive their credentials and accomplishments. 19
The initial fissures in this occupational apartheid emerged in the
1960s, reflecting the profound social and policy evolutions of the Civil
Rights Era. Law schools around the country began admitting
unprecedented numbers of black students-the number of newly
minted black attorneys doubled by the decade's end.20 During this
period, elite law schools launched ambitious affirmative action
admissions programs, 2 1 thereby substantially increasing the population
of black attorneys with the prestigious credentials that America's largest
law firms coveted.22
This new supply of highly credentialed black attorneys arrived at a
favorable historical moment. With liberalized racial norms,
skyrocketing hiring needs,23 and the rise of black political power,2 4 law
The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African American, Latino, and
American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2003)
(through the mid-1960s, black students accounted for only approximately one percent of law
school students).
19 For example, even William Coleman, who graduated first in his class at Harvard Law
School in 1946 before clerking for Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, was rejected by
firms in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York before finally being hired by Paul Weiss. See
WILLIAM COLEMAN, COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA'S
PROMISE (2010); Tamara Loomis, Practicing What They Preach, MINORITY L.J., Spring 2004.
20 Between 1965 and 1967, the number of black law school graduates roughly doubled, from
around 200 to approximately 400 per year. Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 1080.
21 See, e.g., Macklin Fleming & Louis Pollak, The Black Quota at Yale Law School, PUB. INT.,
Spring 1970, at 44, 44-45 (describing Yale Law School's aggressive new affirmative action
admissions practices); Peter Winograd et al., The Disadvantaged Student and Preparation for
Legal Education: The New York University Experience, 2 U. TOL. L. REV. 701 (1970). Compare
Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L.
REv. 351, 352 (1971) (contending that the growing use of special admissions standards for
black law school applicants will "disserve the cause of Negro equality, impair educational
quality, and result in deviation of the schools from their educational function"), with Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., In Defense of Minority Admissions Programs: A Response to Professor Graglia, 3 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 241, 243 (1973) (arguing that affirmative action admissions standards used at Yale
and other law schools "are not violative but in furtherance of sound educational policies.").
22 See Edwards, supra note 18; Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 1077-85. At Harvard Law School,
one of the primary feeder schools to the nation's elite law firms, the number of black law
students in the entering classes increased from a mere three in 1963 to sixty-five in 1971.
Kidder, supra note 18, at 10. By 1970, black students also constituted ten percent or more of the
entering classes at several other elite law schools, including the University of Michigan and
UCLA. See id.
23 This increase in the supply of black attorneys came about just as law firms began to
rapidly expand their workforces and increase associate hiring. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991);
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW
FIRM (1988).
24 See Frederick F. Smith Jr., Are America's Law Firms Willing to Make Blacks Partners?, 15
BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1984, at 63, 66 (the ascent of black Americans to leadership positions
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firms demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to take on black
attorneys.25 In 1968, Law professor Ernest Gellhorn observed that "Wall
Street-type firms that would not have considered hiring Negros ten
years ago now actively recruit them."26 Some of the most prestigious
firms in the leading legal markets of New York, Washington, D.C.,
Chicago, and Philadelphia began hiring small numbers of black
attorneys; several even named their first black partners. 27 Large firms in
other parts of the country soon followed suit.28
Though these developments evidenced an extraordinary
breakthrough on the part of black attorneys, the pace of racial progress
over the next forty years proved to be slow and unsteady. By 1979, only
twelve (<1%) of the 3,700 partners at the fifty largest law firms in the
country were black29 By 1990, the twenty-five largest law firms in New
York City had a total of only twenty-one black partners, 30 and only 157
in some of the nation's largest municipal governments created greater opportunities for black
professionals working in elite professional service firms).
25 A small number of early outliers had each hired a single black attorney by the early
1960s. See PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL
STREET LAW FIRMS (1973); RICHARD L. ZWEIGENHAFT & G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, BLACKS IN
THE WHITE ELITE: WILL THE PROGRESS CONTINUE? (2003).
26 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 1071.
27 See Atty. Julian Wilkins, 57, Dies After Lengthy Illness, JET, July 23, 1984, at 12 (Julian
Wilkins became the first black partner of a major Chicago firm at Jenner and Block in 1972);
Trevor Jensen, Charles E. Lomax, 1924-2009: Longtime Lawyer for Don King, CHI. TRIB., (Sept.
25, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-09-25/news/0909240874 1 sidley-austin-
don-king-productions-mr-lomax (Lomax became one of the first black partners at any large
Chicago law firm when he joined Sidley Austin in 1975); Selected Profiles of Massachusetts
Judges and Lawyers: Attorney Harry T. Daniels, MASS. HIST. SoC'Y, http://www.masshist.org/
longroad/03participation/profiles/daniels.htm (last visited July 22, 2016) (Harry T. Daniels
became the first black partner at a major Boston firm in 1978); Philadelphia Lawyer and Retired
Judge to Receive Lifetime Achievement Award at PBA Minority Attorney Conference, PA. B.
ASS'N (Jan. 26, 2010), https://www.pabar.org/public/news%20releases/prO12610.asp (James
Giles became one of the first black partners at a major Philadelphia law firm in 1974). Conrad
Harper became one of the first black partners at a major New York law firm in 1974. See C.
Harper Becomes First Black to Head N.Y. Bar, JET, June 11, 1990, at 18.
28 Firms in the largest southern legal markets named their first black partners in the late
1970s and 1980s. See Tamara Loomis, Hunton's Change of Heart: How an Old-Line Southern
Law Firm Learned to Embrace Diversity, NAT'L L.J., May, 9 2006 (describing Hunton and
Williams' decisions to hire and promote John Charles Thomas as one of the first black firm
attorneys in the south); Kevin King, 'Texas Super Lawyer' Rufus Cormier Looks Back at His Rise
to the Top, EXAMINER (Feb. 26, 2016, 1:00 AM), http://theexaminer.com/stories/news/
%E2%80%98texas-super-lawyer%E2%80%99-rufus-cormier-looks-back-his-rise-top (Rufus
Cormier became the first black partner at a major Texas firm in 1981); Press Release, State Bar
of Georgia, Celebration of Civil Rights Milestones (June 3, 2015), http://www.gabar.org/
newsandpublications/pressrelease/upload/Program-civil rights-2015.pdf (noting that Charles
Johnson III became the first black partner at a major Atlanta law firm in 1979).
29 Laura A. Kiernan, Survey Finds Only 12 Blacks as Partners in Nation's 50 Biggest Firms,
WASH. POST, July 16, 1979. In 1983, 2.1% of the total attorneys at the top 100 law firms in the
country were black Smith Jr., supra note 24, at 64.
30 Steven Beschloss & Robert McNatt, A Broken Trust: Many Black Professionals Are
Turning Their Backs on Corporate New York and Changing the Rules of Gain, CRANE'S N.Y.
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(2.4%) of the 6,673 associates at these firms were black.31 Decades after
the first black attorneys set foot in the hallowed halls of these firms,
fewer than fifty of the nation's 250 largest law firms had named more
than one black partner. 32
B. Present Inequalities
Though the absolute numbers of black attorneys in elite firms have
risen substantially over the past generation, their relative representation,
particularly in the partnership ranks, have increased only modestly. As
of 2014, only 3% of all attorneys 33 and fewer than 2% of partners 34 at
major law firms were black, a statistic possibly inflated by the inclusion
of black junior and other non-equity partners. 35  Despite the
extraordinary resources that these firms devote toward better recruiting
and retaining attorneys of color,36 and their relative success in hiring
diverse first-year cohorts of junior associates, these firms by and large
have failed to ensure that black associates receive equal treatment and
access to work opportunities.
The failure of these firms to retain and promote black attorneys has
captured the attention of a varied array of outside interests and
observers, including the large corporations who hire them,37 bar
Bus., Oct. 30 1989, at 31; Michael King, Ambition on Trial, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Feb.1990, at
132.
31 Beschloss & McNatt, supra note 30; King, supra note 30.
32 Joel Glenn Brenner, Minority Lawyers Missed Out on Hiring Boom; Study Shows
Underrepresentation in Largest Firms Despite Expansion of Last Decade, WASH. POST, Feb. 13,
1990.
33 Debra Cassens Weiss, Only 3 Percent of Lawyers in BigLaw Are Black, and Numbers Are
Falling, A.B.A. J. (May 30, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/only-3-percent of-
lawyers-in biglaw are-blackwhichfirms were mostdiverse; see Methodology: How We
Measure Diversity, AM. LAW. (May 29, 2014), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=
1202656370271/Methodology- How-We- Measure- Diversity?slreturn =20160706010754 (noting
that black attorneys were "the only minority group to lose ground over the past five years").
34 See Elizabeth Olson, Many Black Lawyers Navigate a Rocky, Lonely Road to Partner, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2015, at B1.
35 See Shannon Henson, Law Firms Take Heat for 'Juicing' Partner Stats, LAW360 (Mar. 15,
2010, 4:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/153118/law-firms-take-heat-for-juicing-
partner-stats (noting allegations that a disproportionate percentage of non-equity partners are
women and minorities). See generally William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier
Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1691 (2006) (noting that
many of the nation's 200 largest law firms have transitioned to dual-track partnership ranks).
36 See Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A Market-Based Argument for
Law Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing a survey finding that participating
Am Law 200 firms allocated an average of $513,500 for their diversity managers' offices); Root,
supra note 1, at 598-601 (discussing diversity efforts undertaken by various law firms in
response to client pressure).
37 Corporate clients have played a leading role in efforts to induce large firms to secure
greater racial diversity. See generally If the Client Insists They Be Given a Chance, Minority
2016]
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associations, 38  and industry organizations. 39  Despite significant
inducements and pressure from corporate clients40 and a proliferation
Lawyers at Large Law Firms Do Succeed, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2007, at 57
(discussing the efforts of several corporations in promoting greater diversity in the law firms
that service them); Melissa Maleske, Designing Diversity: Law Departments Share Their
Strategies to Drive Inclusion Programs, INSIDE COUNS., June 2009, at 48, 50 (many of the
nation's largest corporations now regularly survey and request information about diversity
statistics and procedures from the law firms interested in competing for their business).
38 The ABA, which had once firmly resisted the entrance of racial minorities into the upper
realms of the profession, formally excluding black attorneys until 1943, eventually came to
embrace the push for greater racial diversity as a top organizational goal, releasing numerous
reports and public statements on the topic. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON
MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1986) (detailing
the persisting segregation in the industry and finding that minorities were still deprived of
equal opportunity); AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESOURCE GUIDE:
PROGRAMS TO ADVANCE RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)
(embracing goals of increasing the number of black law students and improving the
recruitment, training, retention and promotion of black attorneys at law firms); Terry Carter,
Diversity and Surprises: Departing President Archer Saw Minorities Advance, Handled
Unexpected Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 28, 2004, at 72 (discussing ABA president Dennis Archer's
efforts to renew the organization's focus on diversity by convening conferences and panels
throughout the country).
39 For example, the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), a non-profit legal
industry organization, gathers extensive data about individual law firms. See, e.g., Women and
Minorities Maintain Representation Among Equity Partners, Broad Disparities Remain, NALP:
NALP BULL. (Mar. 2016), http://www.nalp.org/0316research. Industry periodicals use similar
data to develop rankings and reports that are publicly disseminated; see also Law Firms Make
Slow Progress on Diversity, AM. LAW. (June 21, 2016), http://www.americanlawyer.com/
id= 1202758333171/Law- Firms- Make- Slow- Progress -on- Diversity. Stanford University's
"Building a Better Legal Profession" also actively tracks and rates law firms' diversity. See Adam
Liptak, In Students' Eyes, Look-Alike Lawyers Don't Make the Grade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2007,
at A10.
40 Some corporate clients began pushing for greater diversity many years ago. See ABA
President Dennis Archer: His Goals-And Dedication To Diversity, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COuNS., Feb. 2004, at 37, 38 (in 1988, Harry Pearce, then Vice President and General Counsel
of General Motors, became the first attorney of a major corporation to formally request that his
law firms develop more diverse workforces); Karen Donovan, Pushed by Clients, Law Firms
Step Up Diversity Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at C6 (DuPont began considering diversity
as a criterion for selecting law firms in the 1990s). This issue did not rise to the national
spotlight though until 1999, when Charles Morgan, General Counsel of BellSouth, got
representatives of nearly 500 corporations to sign his proposal, "Diversity in the Workplace, A
Statement of Principle." See Anjali Chavan, Current Development, The "Charles Morgan Letter"
and Beyond: The Impact of Diversity Initiatives on Big Law, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 522-
23 (2010); see also Donovan, supra, at C6 (In 2004, Roderick A. Palmore, then General Counsel
at Sara Lee, authored a more strongly-worded follow-up statement, "The Call to Action" which
insisted that law firms take more proactive measures in improving diversity).
In the past decade, Wal-Mart has received national recognition for its comprehensive,
and at times aggressive, efforts to monitor the diversity of its law firms and to push them to
achieve greater diversity. See, e.g., Donovan, supra (explaining that Wal-Mart terminated two of
its law firms solely because of their lack of progress in meeting diversity objectives); Alana
Roberts, Corporate Push for Law Firm Diversity Enters a New Phase, CORP. COUNS. (July 11,
2008), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202422926103/Corporate-Push-for- Law- Firm-
Diversity- Enters-a-New-Phase (Wal-Mart developed special software to monitor the diversity
of its outside counsel, and, within the first several years of its efforts, the company had awarded
more than $60 million worth of its legal business to firms with minority or female relationship
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of best practices from bar associations and diversity consultants,41 black
attorneys at these firms continue to experience systemic racially
disparate treatment.
Survey data from the "After the JD" study,42 the best available
statistical data on the career experiences and outlooks of law firm
associates,43 reveals some of the racial disparities in treatment from
senior attorneys that black associates encounter in these firms.
Compared to their white counterparts, black associates receive lower
quality assignments,44 have less social contact with partners at their
firms,45 and receive less satisfactory mentorship.46 These racial
disparities culminate in black associates leaving their firms significantly
partners); Kellie Schmitt, Corporate Diversity Demands Put Pressure on Outside Counsel, CORP.
COUNS. (Dec. 28, 2006), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=900005470357/Corporate-Diversity-
Demands- Put- Pressure-on-Outside-Counsel (Wal-Mart has asked that its law firms supply it
with the names of women or minority attorneys who may potentially serve as their primary
contacts on their cases).
41 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS 26-30
(2010); NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, DIVERSITY BEST PRACTICES GUIDE (2016); ARIN N.
REEVES, AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FROM VISIBLE INVISIBILITY
TO VISIBLY SUCCESSFUL: SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR LAW FIRMS AND WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW
FIRMS (2008).
42 See After the ID, AM. B. FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/publications/
afterthejd.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
43 See id. (describing After the JD as "the first and most ambitious effort to gather
systematic, detailed data about the careers and experiences of a national cross-section of law
graduates"). Though it represents an impressive undertaking, the After the JD study is not
without its limitations. Most notably, the sample includes only a relatively modest number of
black associates with jobs at large law firms and suffers from significant nonresponse and
attrition rates. See id. Therefore, though the survey is nationally representative by design, these
data issues may compromise its effectiveness in providing precise generalizable insights about
black law firm associates.
44 See, e.g., Monique R. Payne-Pikus et al., Experiencing Discrimination: Race and Retention
in America's Largest Law Firms, 44 L. & SOC'Y REV. 553, 567, 569 (2010) (finding that white
associates in large law firms report doing a lesser proportion of routine legal work compared to
their black and Hispanic counterparts); Sander, supra note 1, at 1800-02 (black attorneys less
likely to report handling an entire matter on their own, being involved in formulating strategy
on half or more of their matters, or being responsible for keeping their clients updated); id. at
1802 (black attorneys were more likely to report spending "100+ Hours Reviewing Discovered
Documents/Performing Due Diligence on Prepared Materials."); Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann, Job
Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination: Evidence from the Early Careers of
Lawyers (Aug. 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33466/1/
MPRA-paper. 33466.pdf.
45 See Payne-Pikus et al., supra note 44, at 567-72 (2010) (discussing difference in black
and white law firm associates' social support).
46 See id.; Sander, supra note 1, at 1798 ("Nonwhites-especially blacks-exhibit a striking
concern over the absence of mentoring and training in their jobs, relative to white men").
Though mentorship is subject to any number of different definitions, each with distinct
nuances, the term can generally be understood as describing developmental relationships
between individual workers (prot~g~s) and more senior workers (mentors). See George F.
Dreher & Taylor H. Cox, Jr., Race, Gender, and Opportunity: A Study of Compensation
Attainment and the Establishment of Mentoring Relationships, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 297, 298
(1996).
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more rapidly than white associates,47 usually well before they are eligible
to be considered for partnership.48
Although the available statistical evidence demonstrates the
existence of these highly concerning black-white differences, our
understanding of racial inequality in America's large law firms remains
limited by a lack of in-depth qualitative research into the lived
experiences of black associates. The following Part will examine more
closely the specific challenges and problems that black associates
experience during their day-to-day lives in these firms. Using evidence
from an empirical study of black attorneys who have worked in large
law firms, the following Part will bring into focus the problem of human
capital discrimination, the process through which unequal access to
quality work assignments limits the careers of black associates and
reinforces racial inequality.
II. HUMAN CAPITAL DISCRIMINATION: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
A. Empirical Methodology
This Part presents findings from personal interviews of seventy-
five black attorneys who worked as associates at large, predominantly
white law firms during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 49 The
members of this interview sample all began their legal careers as first-
year associates between 1999 and 2009, with most joining their firms
between 2003 and 2007. These interviewees were a subsample of a larger
sample of interviews that I conducted for my dissertation research on
the significance of race for the current generation of young black
professionals working in elite firms in a number of high-status
industries.50 I developed this sample through use of chain referral (or
"snowball") sampling methods, an approach commonly used to gather
47 See Payne-Pikus et al., supra note 44, at 559-60; Sander, supra note 1, at 1805-07 (black
associates more likely than white associates to leave their firms); Liane Jackson, Minority
Women are Disappearing from BigLaw-and Here's Why, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:15 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/minority women are disappearing-from-
biglaw and heres why.
48 See Payne-Pikus et al., supra note 44, at 559-60.
49 Kevin Woodson, Fairness and Opportunity in the Twenty-First Century Corporate
Workplace: The Perspectives of Young Black Professionals (Nov. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Woodson, Fairness and
Opportunity]. They ranged in age from twenty-six to forty, with most in their late twenties or
early thirties. Id. at 249. I conducted all of these interviews between 2009 and 2011. The vast
majority of these interviews (seventy) were conducted by phone, while five were conducted in
person. Id. at 251.
50 Id.
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participants from not easily accessible populations,s including black
workers in high-status jobs.52
I conducted these interviews in a semi-structured life history
format.53 Participants began their interviews by providing narrative
information about their personal backgrounds, childhood experiences,
educational trajectories, and work experiences prior to entering the legal
profession. The interviews then focused on participants' experiences
working at large law firms. Interviewees discussed their overall
experiences and impressions of their firms broadly, and also were asked
specifically to describe whether and how "race" had affected their career
experiences and outcomes, if at all.54 The interviews were on average
between sixty and ninety minutes in length.
These interviewees reported a diverse array of career experiences
and shared sharply diverging views about the significance of race for
black associates working in their firms. On one hand, approximately a
quarter (n=20) of all interviewees reported that they had not
experienced or observed any treatment indicating that black associates
were disadvantaged by race in their firms.55 On the other, the remaining
interviewees (n=55) perceived that black associates faced career
disadvantages in their firms.56 This latter group articulated a wide array
51 See Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of
Chain Referral Sampling, 10 SOC. METHODS & RES. 141, 141 (1981) (explaining that this method
is well-suited for research on sensitive topics); Oisin Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite
Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling, 40 POL. SCI. & POL. 765, 770 (2007)
(snowball sampling is "particularly suitable when the population of interest is not fully visible").
52 See, e.g., LOIS BENJAMIN, THE BLACK ELITE: FACING THE COLOR LINE IN THE TWILIGHT
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Sharon M. Collins, Black Mobility in White Corporations:
Up the Corporate Ladder but Out on a Limb, 44 SOC. PROB. 55 (1997).
53 See generally TOM WENGRAF, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH INTERVIEWING: BIOGRAPHIC
NARRATIVE AND SEMI-STRUCTURED METHODS 5 (2001). At the beginning of each interview, I
asked that they begin by telling me about their personal circumstances and educational
experiences during childhood, and I explained that I would ask clarifying and follow-up
questions according to their comments. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Samantha (Jan. 15,
2010). Interviewees were asked to discuss the racial and socioeconomic demographics of their
schools and communities, and their encounters with racial mistreatment. Id. Interviewees were
then asked to discuss their college and professional experiences and to explain what led them to
pursue employment in large corporate law firms. Id. I asked them to discuss their career
experiences at their firms, and to discuss any ways in which they believed that they or other
black workers there were affected by race. Id.
54 Woodson, Fairness and Opportunity, supra note 49, at 250-51. Some of the interviewees
volunteered their perceptions concerning the racial fairness of their firms early in their
discussions of their experiences at their firms, without any direct prompting.
55 To be clear, even these attorneys generally allowed for the possibility that race might
affect black associates at their firms in ways that were difficult to detect.
56 See infra Sections II.B-C. These interviewees differed in subtle but important ways in
their descriptions and explanations of these problems. While approximately half of this group
sensed that at least some partners in their firms discriminated against black associates on the
basis of race (for example, racial biases and stereotypes), the others sensed that white partners
at times provided preferential treatment to white associates on the basis of shared social and
cultural common ground that better enabled them to develop rapport with one another.
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of anecdotes and examples of racial unfairness in their firms, covering
everything from deliberately racially offensive and antagonistic
comments by partners, to lack of mentorship and social inclusion, to
unfair treatment during their annual performance evaluations. The
concern that appeared most salient to the broadest number of
interviewees, however, was that black associates in their firms lacked
equal access to the type of high-quality work assignments that would
enable them to develop human capital and valuable professional skills.
This concern was raised by more than a third (n=21) of this latter group
of interviewees. Those perceiving human capital discrimination were a
diverse group. Some were junior and mid-level associates struggling to
succeed in their firms despite these obstacles. Others were counsels and
partners who, despite faring well in their firms, resented having to take
on extra, unfair burdens en route to achieving career success. And a
third cohort had already left their firms in frustration, unable to
overcome the debilitating effects of their unequal access to
developmental work assignments and mentorship. The remainder of
this Part will examine the experiences and perspectives of these
attorneys in order to flesh out the workings and consequences of
BigLaw's human capital discrimination problem.
B. Human Capital: The Essence ofAssociate Careers
In the early 1960s, a group of influential economists developed the
concept of human capital to emphasize the manner in which workers
spend considerable time and energy investing in and cultivating skills
and knowledge that enhance their productivity.57 This formulation of
human behavior emphasized that workers do not simply sell their labor
power but also invest in it in ways that can benefit them in the future. As
economist Theodore Schultz explained, "[1]aborers have become
capitalists.., from the acquisition of knowledge and skill that have
economic value. This knowledge and skill are in great part the product
of investment."58 Scholarship relating to the accrual of human capital
has addressed a broad range of productivity inputs, from activities that
sustain the physical health of workers,59 to knowledge- and skill-based
investments that enhance worker productivity over longer time
horizons, such as formal education,60 on-the-job training,61 and
57 See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 9 (1962); Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1961). Economists had long recognized the underlying concept concerning the value of
workers' particular skills and talents, dating back to the writings of Adam Smith. See id.
58 Schultz, supra note 57, at 3.
59 ld. at 4-5, 9.
60 Id. at 1.
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informal leisure-time learning.62 A critical distinction with respect to
human capital is that between firm-specific capital, which only increases
a worker's productivity within her current employment context, general
human capital provides workers portable skills that thereby increase
their value to other employers.63 For attorneys, the most highly valued
forms of human capital tend to be general skills that increase their value
to employers throughout the industry.
Though the opportunity to develop general human capital has
become an increasingly important implicit condition of employment in
a variety of industries and occupations,64 it is particularly consequential
for the career prospects of law firm associates. Access to "training work"
assignments-the high-level legal tasks that provide instrumentally
valuable skills and experiences65-determines whether associates will be
able to compete for partnership at their current firms or for desirable
positions elsewhere in the profession. Despite having prestigious
educational credentials, junior associates at large firms begin their
careers with very little training with respect to the actual legal services
performed by practicing attorneys. These newly minted attorneys
therefore must develop their professional skills and judgment on the
job, by handling increasingly sophisticated assignments under the
guidance of more senior attorneys.66 Experience handling skill-
enhancing work responsibilities therefore emerges as an especially
valuable, if intangible, asset that acts to credential certain associates as
more advanced and more proven than their less experienced peers. 67 As
law firm partners Luis Diaz and Patrick Dunican Jr. explain, "Over time,
61 Id. Nobel Laureate Gary Becker called attention in particular to the manner in which
workers "increase their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting old ones while on the
job." Becker, supra note 57, at 11.
62 See Schultz, supra note 57, at 1.
63 See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 535 (2001).
64 In The New Psychological Contract, law professor Katherine Stone posits that in
abandoning the traditional internal labor market model of employment, in which workers
enjoyed long-term job security, employers embraced a new incentive structure in which the
opportunity to develop career-enhancing human capital became a principal means of inducing
worker loyalty and motivation. Id. at 521. This arrangement essentially transformed the
promise of long-term employment into a promise of long-term employability, made possible by
the valuable, portable skills that workers developed on the job. Id. at 570.
65 See Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament, supra note 1, at 1608-13.
Interviewees used different terms to describe this work, including "good work," "real work,"
and "getting experience."
66 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 23, at 5 ("[A]ssociates ... are given a prospect of
eventual promotion to partnership after an extended probationary period during which they
work under the supervision of their seniors, receive training, and exercise increasing
responsibility.").
67 For these reasons, access to these assignments also functions as an informal status marker




the pattern of assignments given to professionals will profoundly
influence their professional development, their worth to the firm and
clients, and their satisfaction with the firm, and, as a result, their
motivation and productivity."68
The value of training work opportunities and its impact on
associates' career prospects was a common point of discussion during
these interviews. Interviewees recognized that their law school training
had not provided them the specific skills necessary to perform the day-
to-day responsibilities of their jobs and understood that, as a result,
their career prospects, more so than many of their counterparts in other
fields, depended upon their ability to learn on the job. One interviewee,
Samantha, a mid-level litigation associate, emphasized this point by
contrasting legal and medical careers. 69 She explained that unlike in the
medical profession, where new physicians emerge from their residencies
with the skills necessary to function as doctors, "when you come out to
large law firms, you are still being taught."70 Elizabeth, a mid-level
transactional associate, suggested that associates who did not receive
sufficient access to such work were not "real lawyer[s],"71 but rather,
glorified paralegals72 or "Due Diligence Queen[s]."73 She drew a stark
contrast between assignments that provided associates experience
developing deal strategies and experience managing client relationships
and the more mundane, low-value tasks that junior associates (and less
fortunate mid-level and senior associates) worked on in her group. 74
[W]hen you're a junior associate, you're doing junior stuff. You're
doing due diligence. But then when you become a mid-level, it
becomes very important that you start doing substantive work like
drafting, that you start at least observing the negotiations more ....
As a mid-level, it's very, very critical that you start getting senior
associate type work because otherwise you could end up getting
pigeon-holed into the junior responsibilities that you'll never grow
into partner-level experience. 75
As Elizabeth's observation implicitly suggests, not all associates
receive equal or adequate access to such work opportunities. The law
68 Diaz & Dunican, supra note 1, at 975.
69 Telephone Interview with Samantha, supra note 53.
70 Id. This Article identifies interviewees through pseudonyms, in order to protect the
confidentiality of all study participants.
71 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth (Aug. 2, 2009).
72 Id. Elizabeth quipped that "a legal assistant" could probably perform the undesirable due
diligence assignments handled by many associates in her department. Id.
73 Elizabeth described one of her colleagues, a mid-level associate who had begun to refer to






firm personnel model, in which associates sit in virtual labor pools and
are assigned to assist more senior attorneys as needed, tends to produce
surplus supplies of associate labor, enabling partners in some instances
to funnel their assignments to their chosen associates while neglecting
or avoiding others. Brad, a mid-level associate, contrasted this
arrangement with the team-based approach of investment banking,
which in his view provided senior professionals far greater incentives to
enhance the human capital of their junior colleagues.
[The way] banks work is you're on a team.... [E]veryone there at
least on your team has a vested interest in you getting better because
the better you are, the quicker you get things done. Whereas at law
firms, they don't have the same vested interest in training you
because if [Brad] can't get it done then screw it, we're just going to
give it to [another associate] and overwork her. And so there's more
"languish". [L]aw firms will let you sit there and make money,
and not teach you anything. That's one of the key differences in that
a law firm can have this benign [neglect] attitude toward you .... 76
Although many law firms have attempted to limit the leeway of
individual partners in allocating opportunities to their preferred
associates by designating assignment coordinators and developing
centralized assignment protocols, these efforts have had limited
effectiveness. A number of interviewees explained that the formal
assignment processes of their firms generally only provided access to the
least desirable work assignments on low-value matters. 77 As a general
matter, partners who bring business into their firms are able to staff
their matters as they see fit, 7 8 formal rules notwithstanding. As such,
interviewees regarded these formal channels as last resorts only fit for
desperate associates unable to find work through their relationships
with senior attorneys.
In their foundational article, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers
in Corporate Law Firms?, law professors David Wilkins and Mitu Gulati
present a stylized model in which law firm associates are placed in one
of two internal career "tracks."79 Under this conceptual model, some
associates receive prized developmental assignments while others are
76 Telephone Interview with Brad (Feb. 5, 2010). This observation was consistent with some
of those offered by investment bankers whom I interviewed for my dissertation. See Woodson,
Fairness and Opportunity, supra note 49.
77 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Horace (July 15, 2009) ("If you're working for the
managing partner of the firm or... the department head, then your rewards are much more
plentiful. Rather, if you're working with the assignment pool process, you're probably generally
working for lower level partners .... You're working for people who ... don't have as much
pull.").
78 See Diaz & Dunican, supra note 1, at 975.
79 Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers, supra note 1, at 499.
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tasked with less rewarding assignments. 80 Wilkins and Gulati make clear
the importance of training work and the human capital that it provides
associates for their promotion prospects within their firms.81 This
human capital can be just as critical, however, for the many law firm
associates who have no interest in competing in their firms' partnership
tournaments. 82 Because of the highly leveraged, pyramid-shaped
employment structures of large law firms,83 virtually none of the junior
associates who begin their careers at one of these firms will be able to
ascend to its partnership ranks. Instead, most newly hired attorneys
ultimately end up seeking employment elsewhere within a few years of
joining these firms.84 Those departing attorneys, particularly those who
wish to vie for competitive employment positions elsewhere-including
jobs at other large firms and certain in-house counsel and governmental
positions-also benefit from developing as much human capital as
possible, as early as possible in their law firm careers.
Naomi, a junior litigation associate, explained the value of human
capital for all junior associates, whatever their ultimate career
ambitions. Though Naomi had never intended to remain at her firm
long enough to compete for promotions,85 she was still cognizant of the
risk of being pigeonholed into low-level assignments that would deprive
her of the human capital necessary to pursue positions outside the firm.
She explained the risk of being swamped with too much "scut work."86
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 As several interviewees noted, many attorneys begin their careers at these firms with no
real interest in competing for partnership. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Alexis (Jan. 28,
2010) ("So many people... come in not wanting to make partner.... A lot of people just use
the firm as your holding pattern. It's a place for you to make a lot of money, pay off your loans,
and figure out what do I really want to do."). Associate positions provide young attorneys
opportunities to earn high salaries, enhance their resumes, and develop skills and training that
will enable them to lead successful careers upon leaving their firms to pursue other
opportunities. See, e.g., id.; Telephone Interview with Bruce (Mar. 5, 2010) (explaining that the
skills and exposure he gained performing high-level associate work eventually enabled him to
attain a position in the legal department of a prestigious corporate client). Interviewees
suggested that this might be especially true for black associates, many of whom may arrive with
such plans either because they possess alternative career goals and interests or because they
suspect that the odds of making partner as a black associate are prohibitively low. See
Telephone Interview with Harmony (Aug. 5, 2009) ("To be honest, this is my own personal
view [but] I don't think a lot of black people come to law firms wanting to be successful. In the
sense that, I think they're there to make good money and leave after a few years .... "). For
these attorneys, the prospect of promotion to partnership in eight (or more) years is an
afterthought to their more immediate and direct professional development goals.
83 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 23, at 60-64.
84 Id.
85 Telephone Interview with Naomi (July 29, 2009). Naomi explained during our interview




[T]here's a point where you end up where that's all you're doing and
you're not really growing or developing. So what happens is there's a
point where you find yourself a couple years down the road where
you're technically a third-year associate but you don't have the skills
that a third year associate should have because you were just getting
piled with work that wasn't really teaching you or advancing
you.... [A]t the end of the day if you leave somewhere after being
there for several years and you don't have the experience that [an
associate] who's been there for several years should have, wherever
you're [seeking employment], they're not going to say "Oh, we
understand, someone probably strong-armed you and didn't allow
you to do anything substantive"; they're going to be looking for
someone who has that [experience].87
To avoid such outcomes, Naomi found that it was necessary at
times for associates to proactively seek out "substantive work that
requires your analytical skills or intellect, that will expose you to new
experiences and develop your skill set."88
Though associates of all races are at risk of the fates described by
Naomi and Elizabeth above, many of the attorneys interviewed for this
study perceived that black associates were particularly susceptible to
such human capital deprivation.89 The following section will call
attention to the disparate treatment of black and white associates during
assignment decisions at large law firms through the first-hand accounts
of some of the attorneys who were interviewed for this study.
C. Racially Disparate Access to Human Capital
At its core, human capital discrimination consists of patterned
differences in the allocation of work assignments from senior attorneys
(partners and senior associates) to more junior attorneys of particular
racial or gender groups. 90 The results of this study, and data from
previous surveys, 91 suggest that human capital discrimination is a
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See infra Section II.C.
90 Though these discrepancies are primarily qualitative in nature, reflecting disparities in
the sophistication and developmental value of the assignments received by individual workers,
some interviewees also reported that black associates in their departments occasionally suffered
from quantitative differences in the amount of work of any kind made available for them. See,
e.g., infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. These disparities can prevent black associates
from meeting their firms' billable hour expectations. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Aja
(Sept. 27, 2009) (explaining that she and a black associate classmate each billed a total of fewer
than fifty billable hours during a recent two-month period). This Article does not view such
disparate treatment as human capital discrimination per se though, as access to such
assignments does little to provide associates access to career-enhancing human capital.
91 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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problem for many black associates in large law firms. Nearly a third of
the seventy-five attorneys interviewed for this study reported that they
personally had received reduced access to developmental work
assignments when compared with their white associate counterparts. 92
In explaining how they came to perceive themselves as victims of
human capital discrimination, these interviewees situated their own
personal experiences, including incidents involving specific colleagues,
within the broader context of systemic racial disparities in the
distribution of premium work assignments within their firms or
departments.
Many of these interviewees emphasized that human capital
discrimination began affecting black workers from the very beginning of
their careers. These attorneys discerned immediate, obvious differences
in the work opportunities made available for certain newly-arrived
white associates, and those that they and their black counterparts
received. Clara, an attorney working at a Midwest law firm, observed
that a new white associate on her hall at the firm regularly received work
opportunities that were not made available to new black associates.
The [white] guy who was in the office across from me .... had come
straight from law school, didn't have any experience or anything, but
he would get tons of work. He would just have so much work that he
would have to turn down people all the time.... I would see people
coming in and saying, "Hi, how are you? I've got this new case, do
you want to be a part of it?" And when I saw new black associates
come in they didn't get that same kind of treatment. 93
Though Clara recognized soon after joining her firm that she
"wasn't getting as much work as some other people,"94 through
discussions with other associates, she eventually learned that many
other black associates in her firm also had been receiving far less
substantive work than their white counterparts.
[W]e literally had meetings, the associate meetings, where.., the
managing partner.., would go around and ask people sometimes,
"what are you working on?," and you could hear the lists. You could
hear the difference in the types of work too. "This is what I'm
working on" with some of the white associates who were around the
same year versus what the black associates were working on and it
was just totally different. 95
Other interviewees offered similar accounts of gradually
recognizing their own difficulties as reflecting broader problems of
92 See supra Section II.A.





racially disparate access to work opportunities in their departments.
Shortly after joining his firm, Langston, a mid-level bankruptcy
associate, began to sense that senior attorneys in his group were offering
him fewer and less substantive assignments than his white peers. He
gradually grew convinced that his own difficulties were part of a larger
pattern of human capital discrimination within the group when he
realized that many of the other black associates in his department
received similar treatment.
[Y]ou start seeing who's getting what and you look at how [black]
people who are senior to you are also getting distributed work and
then you start realizing that it's not about me or my capabilities
because this person is as good ... as their counterparts and yet
they're not getting what they deserve.96
In addition to these group-level patterns, several interviewees also
reported specific instances when white senior attorneys in their firms
deprived black associates of valuable opportunities by providing them to
white associates instead.97 Langston shared an anecdote concerning a
case in which two mid-level associates, a black woman, "who only got
on the case because she had to fight and complain about the fact that
they weren't giving her work," and a white male, who had strong
informal social ties with the partners running the case, 98 were chosen by
partners to "run point" on a case. Early on, the white male associate
"complained off of the case" because he was too busy with other
assignments. The female associate, who was less busy at the time, ran
the case herself. As the matter progressed, however, the partners
eventually cast her aside in favor of the white male associate.
[As] soon as this other guy freed up, her responsibility on the case
was substantially diminished ... and it's perceived to be that they
were trying to make sure that this person had [his] hours to keep him
at the firm, etcetera. Because the female associate should have
been.., running the point for this case. 99
This sequence of events, which Langston offered as an illustration
of the racial disparities in the opportunities to develop human capital at
his firm, underscores that much of the disadvantage encountered by
black associates may stem from seemingly benevolent actions of senior
attorneys working to advance the careers of their prot~g~s and other
favored junior colleagues.
In a similar vein, Elizabeth described an incident where a white
male senior associate in her department blatantly reallocated work
96 Telephone Interview with Langston (Mar. 5, 2010).





responsibilities to provide more human capital development for a
specific white male junior associate, at Elizabeth's expense.100 When
Elizabeth asked the junior associate to handle certain low-level
document management related tasks on the project, a role typically
filled by the most junior associates on deal teams in her department, 101
he went over her head to complain to the senior associate and requested
that he be allowed to work on some of the higher level responsibilities
that had been designated for Elizabeth initially. 102 Instead of
maintaining the agreed-upon division of labor, the senior associate
agreed to steer higher quality assignments to the junior associate and
told Elizabeth that she should "share the crappy work" despite her
relative seniority. 103 During our interview, years after the fact, Elizabeth
described this incident as a "fraternity type of situation,"104 with evident
anger. The success of the white male junior associates in securing
preferential treatment through informal, exparte communications had a
zero sum effect, depriving her of important opportunities to develop
valuable human capital. 105
The racial disparities described by these interviewees do not occur
in a vacuum. Human capital discrimination often stems from disparities
in the relationships (social capital) that junior associates have with
senior colleagues. The instrumental importance of interpersonal
relationships in the workplace has been the topic of extensive research
and commentary. 106 Workers who have stronger professional
relationships enjoy greater access to many important resources,
including high-quality work opportunities, advice, support, and
generous performance reviews. The rapport and goodwill that
colleagues develop through informal relationships with one another
renders them more likely to go above and beyond the formal
requirements of their work roles in order to help advance their
100 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth, supra note 71.
101 Id. Elizabeth also indicated during our interview that the senior associate had agreed to




105 Id. Dissatisfied with the manner in which the senior associate had given some of her
substantive responsibilities to the white male junior associate, Elizabeth ultimately left the case
entirely. Id.
106 See, e.g., ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 54 (1977)
(discussing the known importance of "social connections" for career advancement at a large
corporation); Erika Hayes James, Race-Related Differences in Promotions and Support:
Underlying Effects of Human and Social Capital, 11 ORG. SCI. 493, 503 (2000) (finding that
workers who had stronger interpersonal relationships with colleagues received more
psychosocial support).
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careers. 107 At law firms, mentors often help their proteges develop
human capital by steering valuable work opportunities their way. 108
Black associates tend to possess less workplace social capital than
their white counterparts,109 which renders them more susceptible to
human capital discrimination. Many interviewees observed this of black
associates at their firms. 110 In this respect, human capital discrimination
is consistent with the conceptual framework of "second generation
discrimination."111 Second generation discrimination, as developed by
Susan Sturm, emphasizes the relational and interactional dimensions of
employment inequality by positing that group-based exclusion often
occurs "as a byproduct of ongoing interactions shaped by the structures
of day-to-day decisionmaking and workplace relationships." 112
The interviewees who reported patterns of human capital
discrimination in their firms emphasized that they did not believe that
these discrepancies could be explained by racial differences in merit.
Clara, for example, rejected the suggestion that black associates had
greater difficulty getting work at her firm for performance-based
reasons.
[S]ometimes people try to make it seem like [the problem is that
black associates] do a project poorly and then someone just doesn't
return [with more work opportunities]. That's not always how it
works-there are a lot of people who don't get the initial project at all
because some of those, particularly white partners, and a lot of the
older ones especially, won't even think to talk to you to begin with.
So they don't know what your work product is like. They have no
clue because they've never tried to give you any work. 113
107 See Woodson, Race and Rapport, supra note 2, at 2565-67 (explaining that law firm
associates who have higher quality relationships with colleagues may gain access to more
desirable work assignments).
108 See id.
109 See id. at 2567-68.
110 Langston, for example, reported that a predominantly white male social clique shared
high quality work assignments with each other to the disadvantage of outsiders, including the
group's black associates. Telephone Interview with Langston (Mar. 5, 2010).
111 See generally Sturm, supra note 6, at 460 (explaining that second generation
discrimination involves "social practices and patterns of interaction among groups within the
workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups").
112 Id. at 469.
113 Telephone Interview with Clara, supra note 94. This Article does not assume the truth of
Clara's interpretation of the partners' behavior-it is possible, for example, that they criticized
her work product because it was not up to par. Nonetheless, her account is important in that it
calls attention both to the subjective nature and discretion of performance reviews and the
possibility of them being distorted by racial biases.
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Clara also noted that certain favored white associates, including her
neighbor, continued to receive high quality opportunities even when
they underperformed on their assignments. 114
I'd hear, "Oh, that person forgot a deadline" or didn't come in for the
hearing .... It could be big things but it was always "Aww, you didn't
do it. You have to remember-you have to get -your secretary to
remind you." [in a lighthearted, forgiving tone] And it's like, oh my
god, if I did something like that-that would have been the end
probably. 115
Other interviewees voiced the same insistence that mistakes that
brought seemingly no consequences when committed by their white
counterparts would have significantly reduced their access to further
high-quality work had they been black. 116 Still others reported that even
black associates who performed ably on their initial assignments often
fell through the cracks and received fewer opportunities to further
develop human capital than their white counterparts."17 Brad, a mid-
level associate, reported observing that black associates at his firm were
not "getting the same opportunities that I see some of my white peers
getting."118 He explained that even some black associates who got off to
promising starts at his firm and performed impressively on their initial
assignments never received the social support necessary to thrive long-
term. "I see [black associates] who are actually really thorough with their
work and no one really cares to extend themselves. And that's
something I don't really see with white associates. When they're good,
people take note and start training them to be even better.""9
The accounts of Brad and other interviewees discussed in this
section demonstrate the endless opportunities for various forms of
human capital discrimination to disadvantage even the most talented
black attorneys in large law firms, as everyday actions and decisions
cumulatively produce substantial racial inequalities. The following
Section will identify some of the various harms that these quotidian
forms of institutional discrimination inflict upon black associates.
114 Id. Although Clara heard people criticize her white neighbor's work performance and
professionalism, those criticisms did not prevent them from giving him more work
opportunities or chances to correct his mistakes. See id.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Interview with Langston, supra note 96. Langston, for example, explained that a
white male associate in his department had turned in a sloppy, unfinished draft of the filing to
his partners very shortly before the filing deadline. See id. He was incredulous that the associate
was able to maintain his preferred status among partners despite his abysmal performance,
stating "that would not have happened to me. A forgivable crime if it happens with other
[white] people." Id.
117 Infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.




D. The Subtle Harms of Human Capital Discrimination
Human capital discrimination is a subtle phenomenon with
intangible harms that are often difficult to identify, let alone measure. Its
effects are most evident in the aggregate, when associates come to realize
that their failure to develop sufficient human capital has limited their
career prospects within the firm and beyond. For example, Dawn, who
had left her firm as a mid-level associate after a highly unsatisfying
career there, explained that although the partners in her group kept her
busy with a heavy workload, most of her tasks consisted of low-level
assignments that seldom provided the skills necessary to develop into a
proficient attorney. Looking back on her experience in frustration, she
stated that "at the end of the day, even with all the work that I did, I had
nothing-I had no skill set." 120
In the competitive domain of law firm careers, even relatively
modest differences in treatment if left unchecked can develop into
virtually insurmountable disparities.121 It is in the self-interest of
partners to steer their more challenging work assignments to associates
who already have developed the skills to handle them through their
experience with similar assignments in the past. One attorney,
Samantha, contrasted her experience with that of a white associate in
her group who started working at the firm the same day as her. She
described in great detail how the unequal access to human capital that
she suffered during her first months on the job eventually snowballed
into a virtually insurmountable skill gap.
She billed 180 hours the first month; I billed 60. There should not
have been that big of a disparity because we were both starting out.
You can't say I was doing bad work because I had just started out.
That to me illustrates one of the issues that I was having, getting
work. Why is she getting three times as much work as me and I
haven't messed up? All along, I'm asking for work-I documented it
too .... During my second month, I asked for work but I only got
put on a non-billable project.... I only billed 30 hours [the second
month]. Now at this point, the discrepancy sets in-she's getting
training, she's learning things so that in July when they ask who can
draft a promissory note, she'll be able to say "yeah," and I'll have to
say that it would be my first time. So then there's a perception of one
of us being more qualified than the other. 122
120 Telephone Interview with Dawn (July 17, 2009).
121 See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy,
80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 839, 854 (2005) ("[I]t is the nominally small opportunities that matter in
determining which employees have the chance to compete in later rounds.").
122 Telephone Interview with Samantha, supra note 53.
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Though Samantha's initial problems were perhaps atypically dire, her
experience underscores the cumulative nature of human capital
deprivation and its potential long-term consequences.
Similarly, Elizabeth, who already had fallen behind her white male
classmates by the end of her second year, explained how this early
deficit perpetuated itself for the remainder of her career at the firm, as
she requested in vain that the partners in her group provide her with
opportunities to work on more substantive work assignments.
[M]ost partners want to get the work done.... [T]hey're not really in
this to train you. They don't want to work with someone who's never
done it before.... it was one of those "chicken and the egg" scenarios
[where t]hey only really wanted to work with you if you had that
experience. But how am I going to get that experience unless you
work with me?123
Elizabeth explained that her efforts to seek out new work were for
naught and possibly self-defeating, as she was outing herself as less
qualified to handle high-level assignments than her more experienced
peers. 124 Her difficulties underscore the extent to which initial
inequalities compound over time. Without the help of mentors and
sponsors personally invested in their career development, associates in
Elizabeth's position may struggle to overcome early skills deficits.125
Though they generally have the same salaries and nominal job titles as
the members of their associate classes who have handled more
substantive assignments, they can fall further and further behind their
more fortunate classmates in career development and reputational
standing. 126
This human capital deprivation plays a key role in prompting
many black associates to leave their firms voluntarily, before they have
been fired or subject to any formal reprimands. In fact, one interviewee,
Brad, reported that partners in his firm seemed to intentionally deprive
certain workers of access to substantive work opportunities for the very
purpose of inducing them to leave.
[Tlhere are certain ways that the firm appears to push you out
without actually doing it. You get this bad review from someone in
123 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth, supra note 71.
124 Id. (describing her decision to inform partners that she had not received the same quality
of opportunities as her classmates as "probably the worst thing you can do").
125 See generally Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers, supra note 1, at
568 ("In order to get on the training track, an associate has to have mentors among the firm's
partners or senior associates who can provide the Royal Jelly of good training.").
126 See, e.g., Interview with Dawn, supra note 120 (explaining that although she had been
earning a six-figure salary at her firm, she left after a few years because she was not receiving




your group and all of a sudden that person is powerful enough to
convince other people to not work with you, and you find yourself
sitting there four weeks without work and then when you ask for
work they give you something shitty that someone two or three years
beneath you could do. That's their way of saying, "Hey, we're not
going to give you anything complex anymore so you need to start
looking for a new gig."... [T]here's a freeze-out. There's a kind of
taking you off the project without telling you why. And then you're
just wondering what the heck happened. 127
As discussed later,128 when black associates are nudged to leave their
firms in this manner, without having been formally terminated or
demoted, it effectively forecloses any possible recourse to the
protections of Title VII.
Though the effects of human capital discrimination become most
evident after the careers of black associates who have failed to gain
access to sufficient work opportunities have come to an end, significant
but subtler harms are inflicted upon many black associates well before
then. Human capital discrimination not only deprives black associates
of valuable skills, it also imposes psychological harms that can
undermine their self-confidence and career aspirations. Agnes, a mid-
level associate, described the damaging effects that being denied high-
quality opportunities early on had in weakening her self-esteem and
causing her to abandon any plans of pursuing a long-term career at her
firm.
[W]hen we just started, this guy next to me... would get
work.... My mentor was asking him to be on trials with him.
Whenever I was asked to do something with my mentor it was, "can
you come with me to the [local government agency]" where I would
be a black face basically. And of course I harbored resentment for
that .... Psychologically it affected me.... You start feeling
like.., they don't have faith in me, and it almost transferred into me
going, "Well, can I do this?"129
127 Telephone Interview with Brad, supra note 76. This subtle process also prevents
associates from challenging other more determinative forms of discrimination, as human
capital discrimination cumulatively creates actual racial differences in worker qualifications and
performance that can be used to justify later adverse promotion and termination decisions. To
the extent that racial disparities in promotion and termination decisions reflect these
differences, courts will not likely find that they reflect mistreatment on the basis of race. See,
e.g., Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding law
firm's decision not to consider a black associate for partnership justified by the black associate's
lack of sophisticated work experience, even though the associate had alleged that the firm's
failure to provide him high-level work was racially discriminatory).
128 Infra Part III.
129 Telephone Interview with Agnes (July 29, 2009).
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Attempting to overcome such limited access to human capital-
building assignments comes with a number of additional dignitary,
psychological, and other costs. Several interviewees spoke at length and
with evident frustration about their perceived need to put forth
additional intra-firm "job search" activities to solicit the types of high-
quality assignments that their white peers received as a matter of
course. 130 Interviewees grew fatigued and felt demeaned by these unfair
self-promotion demands. Interviewees explained that this dynamic
contributed to their decisions to voluntarily leave their firms to pursue
career opportunities elsewhere. Clara described how the frustration
from this manifest unfairness contributed to black associates burning
out and leaving her firm.
[T]here's that extra layer of you have to constantly do more in terms
of promoting yourself within the firm .... There were times when I
had to look for work. There were times when I felt that I was bugging
people.... [It] just becomes uncomfortable and people get tired of
begging for work; people get tired of feeling like an outsider.... I've
been out of law school now... years ... and it gets to be frustrating
when you're always trying to make someone even remember your
name... I get tired of having to sell myself, and having to tell them
"you know I did this project" and "I handled that case and I was
successful"-within the firm.... [Tlhat constant trying to promote
yourself, it gets tiring. 131
Clara's exasperated account of her uphill battle to gain recognition and
inclusion at her firm was echoed in the accounts of many other
interviewees. Diana, a mid-level associate at another firm, offered a
similar narrative of frustration. She explained that she had given up
attempting to advance her career at her firm after partners in her group
refused to provide her substantive opportunities, despite her active
efforts to lobby them. She explained, "I really tried.... But I was
constantly asking for work, making my rounds, going to partners-this,
that and the other-and it still wasn't working."132 Diana's report of her
experiences further highlights the difficulty of linking human capital
discrimination to its ultimate career impact. Although the partners in
her group did not outwardly hint to Diana that she should seek
employment elsewhere, she felt that her consistent inability to access the
type of work assignments necessary to develop key professional skills
required her to do so in order to save her career.133
130 See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
131 Telephone Interview with Clara, supra note 94. Clara also recalled the experiences of a
new Asian associate who only billed eight hours in one of his first months at the firm because
he was not assigned sufficient work. Id.




Even some of the more successful interviewees reported being
unfairly denied equal access to human capital development and
described the unfair extra efforts they felt required to undertake to
advance their careers. One such interviewee, Earl, a junior partner,
emphasized that the work opportunities vital to his success at the firm
and development as an attorney had not been as available for him as
they had been for his white associate peers. 134 "[T]here were
[opportunities that] my peers got that I didn't get. There were
[opportunities] that I thought that I was entitled to get that I did not
get."135 Earl explained that to overcome this unfair treatment, he had to
"work... like a dog in exchange for a couple of good opportunities,"136
billing over 3000 hours for multiple years. 137 Though he was able to
advance in his career through these herculean efforts, he resented that
many white associates received the opportunities necessary to thrive at
the firm without such extra labor. 138 Although he suffered none of the
ultimate harms required by current employment discrimination law-
he may have even earned higher bonuses because of his billable hours
and he ultimately made partner-he did so only because he worked
more hours than similarly situated white associates for the same human
capital and reputational rewards.
These psychological and dignitary burdens may be especially acute
for those black associates who feel the need to perform additional
assimilationist identity work to comply with the social and cultural
expectations of their firms. 139 These burdens, which minority associates
may consider exhausting and demeaning, potentially affect successful
and unsuccessful attorneys alike. As the following Part will explain,
however, though it unfairly disadvantages many black associates, in
some instances completely derailing their law firm careers, human




I worked a lot harder.... [T]here were years I billed over 3000 hours. Some of that
was intentional because of the experiences that I chose. I wanted to go to trial, there
were certain cases I wanted to have under my belt, there were certain opportunities
that were out there.
Id.
138 Id. ("[T]here's a ton of white lawyers around here who don't have to bill 3000 hours to
get those kind of opportunities.").
139 For an extended discussion of the potential dignitary harms of such assimilationist
demands, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-20 (2001); see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination,
93 CALIF. L. REv. 623, 633 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture and Discrimination]




capital discrimination is virtually impossible to address under existing
Title VII jurisprudence.
III. TITLE VII AND THE "IMMATERIALITY" OF HUMAN CAPITAL
DISCRIMINATION
The shortcomings of the current jurisprudence for Title VII have
been well documented in the existing employment discrimination
literature. Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has eliminated
much of the more blatant, egregious modes of employment
discrimination, it has fallen far short of its overall goal of eliminating
employment practices that sustain unnecessary racial hierarchy.140 In
recent years, antidiscrimination scholars have examined this failure at
length, addressing various forms of institutional discrimination that
continue to produce unfair racial and gender disparities in American
employment. 141 This literature has called attention in particular to the
incapacity of the existing Title VII doctrine to attend to the subtle,
concealed, and potentially subconscious biases that may be responsible
for much of the continuing employment discrimination in the modern
workplace. 142 These doctrinal defects present a formidable impediment
for workers seeking to hold their employers liable for discriminatory
misconduct.
This Part calls attention to another aspect of Title VII
jurisprudence that further insulates law firms (and other employers)
from liability for certain forms of employment discrimination including,
especially, human capital discrimination: the adverse employment
action doctrine. Even if courts were more willing to accept implicit bias
as a pervasive determinant of employment behavior and adjusted
plaintiffs' evidentiary burdens accordingly, the material adversity
requirement established by federal district and appellate courts would
insulate employers from liability for most of the ostensibly minor
personnel acts and decisions that constitute human capital
discrimination. This Part will provide an overview of this doctrine and
140 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). ("The objective of
Congress .... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.").
141 See, e.g., Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, supra note 139, at 654-58 (discussing
several practical and doctrinal barriers that prevent advocates from forming successful Title VII
claims).
142 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995)
("[T]he way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimination ... is inadequate to
address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias .... ).
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its impact in excluding most forms of human capital discrimination
from the scope of Title VI's coverage.
A. The Adverse Employment Action Doctrine
Most people with a passing understanding of employment
discrimination law are likely familiar with the burden-switching
framework of McDonnell Douglas.143 To present a triable claim of
disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that "(1)
she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse
employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated male
employees more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job."144
When plaintiffs are able to meet these requirements, the burden of
production then shifts to employers to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory explanation for the employment action being
challenged.145 Plaintiffs then are afforded the opportunity to challenge
those nondiscriminatory explanations as pretextual. 146
Many people, however, would be astonished to learn that this
framework, as applied by the federal courts, does not in all instances
hold employers liable for discriminating against their employees on the
basis of race. Although Title VII bans employment practices that
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"147 the adverse
employment action doctrine largely limits the reach of Title VII to
particular types of discrimination that have direct, tangible effects on
employees. Other, lesser forms of discrimination are often deemed
immaterial and insufficiently adverse to justify holding employers
liable.148 Though this material adversity requirement is nowhere to be
found in the statute itself,149 it has become a well-established part of
143 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
144 Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (1999); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802-04.
145 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
146 Id. at 804.
147 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
148 See, e.g., infra notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
149 Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer's Action Was Materially
Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 333, 335 (1999) ("The statutes banning employment
discrimination ... do not require the plaintiff to prove an adverse or materially adverse or
ultimate employment action. The laws require only that the plaintiff show he suffered
'discrimination,' or differing treatment in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of his race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability."
(footnotes omitted)).
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Title VII jurisprudence over the past two decades. This doctrine, which
protects the interests of employers by both preserving their traditional
autonomy and protecting them from frivolous employee grievances,
does so at the expense of mistreated workers.150 Its impact is profound:
with no guidance from the Supreme Court, 151 lower federal courts have
developed this doctrine in a manner that substantially limits the
potential reach of Title VII, virtually immunizing employers from
liability for all but the most extreme instances of human capital
discrimination.152 Though even seemingly minor disparities in access to
substantive assignments can produce catastrophic long-term career
This doctrine is in tension with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC's) own interpretation of the scope of Title VII liability, as evident in some of the
examples of impermissible discrimination included in its Compliance Manual. See U.S. EQUAL
EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 15: RACE & COLOR
DISCRIMINATION (2006) [hereinafter EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 15]. See generally
Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1937, 1937 (2006) ("[A] n examination of decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), reveals that ... the EEOC receives remarkably little respect from the
Court."). In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC provides an example that illustrates the
potential process through which disparities in assignments cumulatively produce
insurmountable human capital disparities. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 15, supra at
44-45. The document provides a hypothetical example of a black woman, Mary, the only black
associate in her cohort at a consulting firm, who receives fewer complex assignments than her
counterparts, despite her stellar performance on her initial assignments and her requests for
more challenging work. Id. As a result, Mary realized that she had lower status than her peers at
the firm by the end of her first year and she decided to leave the firm to pursue her career
elsewhere. Id. To the EEOC, the federal agency tasked with enforcement of Title VII, the
deprivation of opportunities to develop human capital is an illustrative example of
impermissible discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. See id. However,
because Mary voluntarily left her firm before her treatment had produced any tangible
employment outcomes, it seems unlikely that courts would hold Mary's employer liable for the
treatment that she experienced.
150 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) (characterizing the
materiality requirement as reflecting the need to "separate significant from trivial harms");
Lewis v. Chicago, 496 F. 3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the purpose of this rule is
"to provide a reasonable limiting principle for the type of conduct actionable under the statute,"
and to eliminate "'trivial personnel action[s]' brought by 'irritable, chip-on- the-shoulder
employee[s]"' (alterations in original) (quoting Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th
Cir. 2006) and Herrnreiter v. Chic. Hous. Auth, 315 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002))); Herrnreiter,
315 F.3d.at 745 (7th Cir. 2002) (positing that the EEOC is "staggering under an avalanche of
filings too heavy for it to cope with" and that lesser forms of discrimination, such as a trivial
personal action, "do not justify trundling out the heavy artillery of federal antidiscrimination
law"); Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting
that the adverse employment act doctrine reflects a reluctance by federal courts to engage in
"the judicial micromanagement of business practices").
151 See Autumn George, Comment, "Adverse Employment Action"-How Much Harm Must
Be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1075, 1082
(2009) ("To the extent, however, that the plaintiff's claim alleges neither an employment
detriment that entails immediate and obvious economic consequences nor severe and pervasive
harassment, the circuit courts are left to reach their own conclusions about how much harm
must be shown to satisfy the harm element of § 703.").
152 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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consequences for minority associates, in most instances such forms of
racially disparate treatment will not meet the materiality threshold of
the existing case law.
In perhaps the most influential formulation of the adverse
employment act doctrine, the Seventh Circuit, in Crady v. Liberty
National Bank & Trust, explained that a materially adverse employment
act "might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation."13 Although this language on its face has a ring of broad
inclusiveness, the voluminous case law demonstrates that courts have
applied the doctrine quite narrowly and restrictively. 154 Most successful
claims involve one of the first two types of adverse employment actions,
terminations or personnel acts that reduce employees' salaries or other
income. 5 The latter two Crady examples, significantly diminished
responsibilities and "other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation,"156 are potentially broad enough to encompass many forms of
assignment-related discrimination. However, courts have been reluctant
to deem employment actions that deprive workers of access to human
capital and substantive work opportunities materially adverse. As the
Eleventh Circuit explained in Kidd v. Mando American Corp., "it's a rare
case where a change in employment responsibilities qualifies as an
adverse employment action."l17
Some courts have thus far refused to recognize changes in work
responsibilities as adverse employment actions in the absence of
153 Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
154 There is variation, however, in how courts apply this doctrine, with some circuits more
accommodating to plaintiffs than others. In Hillig v. Rumsfeld, for example, the Tenth Circuit
rejected precedents from other circuits that interpreted the requirement stringently as
"inconsistent with our own precedents which require us to 'liberally construe' the term 'adverse
employment action,' and to take 'a case-by-case approach, examining the unique factors
relevant to the situation at hand."' 381 F.3d 1028, 1035 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sanchez v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir.1998)).
155 This extends not only to employment acts that directly lower workers' salaries but also to
acts that reduce their commissions, gratuities, and eligibility for bonuses. See, e.g., Kassner v.
Second Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2007) (waitresses assigned to less desirable
and profitable shifts and stations potentially suffer adverse employment actions); Haynes v.
Level Three Commc'ns, L.L.C., 456 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006) (repeated removal of an
employee's accounts constituted an adverse employment action because the employee was not
given the credit for sales that she deserved).
156 Crady, 993 F.2d at 136.
157 731 F.3d 1196, 1204 n.ll (1lth Cir. 2013); see also Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 149 F.
App'x 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2005) (the "loss of some job responsibilities" does not meet the
adverse employment action requirement under Fifth Circuit case law); Mungin v. Katten
Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[Clhanges in assignments or work-
related duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if unaccompanied by
a decrease in salary or work hour changes.").
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tangible economic harms.158 In Davis v. Town of Lake Park,159 a black
police officer alleged that in discriminatorily stripping him of his "OIC
[Officer in Charge] designation,"160 his employers had "diminished his
prestige and deprived him of [supervisory] experience which might
make him more likely to obtain ... promotions in the future."161 In
dismissing his lawsuit for failing to state an adverse employment action,
the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[a]lthough the statute does not
require proof of direct economic consequences in all cases, the asserted
impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse
effect on the plaintiffs employment."162 Noting that the changes in the
officer's work assignments did not "cause[] any economic injury,"163 the
court opined that "Congress simply did not intend for Title VII to be
implicated where so comparatively little is at stake."164
Other courts have allowed plaintiffs to challenge discriminatory
transfers or changes in work responsibilities without proof of tangible
economic harms, but only if they can demonstrate that their new
positions are "objectively worse" than the former ones. 165 Courts have
often applied this standard in an arbitrary and exacting fashion,
dismissing complaints about substantial unfavorable changes to work
responsibilities as frivolous grievances concerning "mere
inconveniences,166 matters of subjective preferences,167 and "bruised
egos."168 In Crady, for example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding that a worker who was involuntarily transferred from his
position as assistant vice president and branch manager to a loan officer
position at a different branch did not experience an actionable adverse
employment action. 169 In Williams v. U.S. Department of the Navy, the
Fifth Circuit found that a worker who suffered a twenty percent
158 See McCoy v. Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007).
159 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001).
160 Id. at 1243.
161 Id. at 1240.
162 Id. at 1239.
163 Id. at 1240.
164 Id.
165 See Pegram v. Honeywell, 361 F.3d 272, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[A]n employment transfer
may qualify as an adverse employment action if the change makes the job objectively worse."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
166 See Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) ("a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities" does not constitute "a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment").
167 See Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co., 237 F. App'x 9, 24 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n employee's
subjective impressions as to the desirability of one position over another are not relevant."
(citations omitted)).
168 See Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Although the
[employment act] may have bruised [plaintiffs] ego ... a plaintiffs perception that a lateral
transfer would be personally humiliating is insufficient, absent other evidence, to establish a
materially adverse employment action.").
169 See Crady, 993 F.2d at 136.
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reduction in her substantive responsibilities without any effect on her
compensation did not allege an adverse employment act. 170
Courts generally have found personnel decisions that limit
workers' access to human capital opportunities without directly altering
their tangible terms and conditions of employment actionable under
Title VII only in extreme circumstances171 They have done so, for
example, where employers have formally stripped workers of all higher-
level responsibilities or so drastically limited or reordered their work
responsibilities as to effectively demote them to entirely different
occupational positions.172 Courts have found material adversity, for
example, in instances where plaintiffs have been stripped formally of all
higher-level responsibilities. 173 In Czekalski v. Peters, 74 the D.C. Circuit
found that a government employee had alleged a potential175 adverse
employment action when she claimed that her transfer to a new position
decreased her supervisory responsibilities from nine-hundred and sixty
employees to fewer than ten, 176 diminished her budget responsibilities
from $400 million per year to essentially none, 177 and required her to
report to a former peer. 178 In Thompson v. Waco,179 the Fifth Circuit
held that a black detective, who was subject to a number of punitive
restrictions that prevented him from performing his essential duties as a
detective without supervision from other detectives, 180 experienced an
adverse employment act equivalent to a demotion, even though his
170 149 F. App'x 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2005).
171 See Davis v. Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[Iln unusual instances the
change [in work assignments] may be so substantial and material that it does indeed alter the
terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment.").
172 See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014), reh'g denied en banc,
779 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2014); Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
173 See. e.g., Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 369 (drastically reduced supervision and budgetary
responsibilities met adverse employment act requirement).
174 Id.
17s Reflecting the restrictiveness of the adverse employment action doctrine, this court only
found that these substantial downward changes constituted a potential adverse employment
action raising a question of triable fact. Id.
176 Id. at 364-65.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 365. See also Schirle v. Sokudo USA, L.L.C., 484 F. App'x 893, 898-99 (5th Cir.
2012) (manager stripped of substantial proportion of his sales responsibilities suffered adverse
employment action to overcome a granting of summary judgment to employer); Evans v.
District of Columbia, 754 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting motion to dismiss where
plaintiff alleged that her employer had drastically reduced her work responsibilities and
excluded her from important meetings with supervisors).
179 764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir.. 2014), reh'g denied en banc, 779 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2014).
Thompson proved rather controversial, as one judge dissented in the case and four judges later
dissented to the Fifth Circuit's denial of a petition to rehear the case en banc. Id.
180 The restrictions specified that Thompson could not "(1) search for evidence without
supervision; (2) log evidence; (3) work in an undercover capacity; (4) be an affiant in a criminal
case; (5) be the evidence officer at a crime scene; and (6) be a lead investigator on an
investigation." Id. at 502.
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formal title and compensation had not changed.181 In Rodriguez v.
Board of Education,182 the Second Circuit allowed a teacher
discriminatorily transferred from high school to elementary school to
proceed with her claim on the basis of evidence demonstrating that the
two jobs were so "profoundly different" as to render her twenty years of
prior experience "useless." 183 The court agreed that this transfer was "in
effect, a demotion that would constitute a serious professional setback
and stigma to her career."184 Courts also have found that formal
transfers to new jobs universally regarded as less prestigious can also
constitute demotions and that denial of transfers to more prestigious
positions are equivalent to denials of promotions. 185
Although courts may accept negative performance evaluations as
materially adverse when plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have
significantly compromised their job security or career prospects, 18 6
181 Id. at 506; see also Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 633-35 (holding that
the plaintiff successfully pleaded an adverse employment action where facts alleged by plaintiff
indicated that his duties were so restricted on the midnight shift that "it is as if he is not a
sergeant").
182 620 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1980).
183 Id. at 366. But see Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2000)
(teacher assigned to new school did not demonstrate that transfer "was to an assignment that
was materially lerE pretigiouF, materially less suited to his skills and expertise, or rwaterialy less
conducive to career advancement"); Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 41 F. Supp.
2d 249, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (teacher challenging her transfer from first-grade to pre-
kindergarten failed to present sufficient evidence that her reassignment "obliged her to perform
tasks that were less appropriate for her sl-dlls than her prior position or adverse to her in any
other legally cognizable way").
184 Rodriguez, 620 F.2d at 365.
185 See Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F. 3d 605 (5th Cir. 2007) (adverse employment act
where employer denied Texas state trooper's requested appointment to the exclusive Texas
Rangers division, which was universally regarded as equivalent to a promotion in large part due
to its immense prestige). The court also identified the "complexity of the selection process" and
intense "level of competition" for the position as evidence that it was equivalent to a
promotion. Id. at 615; see also de la Cruz v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 82
F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1996). (suggesting that transfer from Adoption Unit to less prestigious
Foster Care Unit "quite thin" but potentially an adverse employment action).
186 See, e.g., Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir.
2013) ("An adverse employment action is defined as a tangible change in working conditions
that produces a material employment disadvantage, including.., changes that affect an
employee's future career prospects .... ); Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1035 (10th Cir.
2004) (divided panel found adverse employment action where plaintiff presented testimony
demonstrating that extremely negative assessments of her performance-including one that
described her as a "shitty employee"- "seriously harm [ed]" her future employment prospects,
and posed an insurmountable competitive disadvantage to other candidates); Herrnreiter v.
Chic. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[B]y preventing [a worker] from using
the skills in which he is trained and experienced, so that the skills are likely to atrophy.");
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that employers can
be held liable for "harms stemming from discriminatory evaluations" when they rely upon the
evaluation as grounds for terminating an employee). But see Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1039 (10th Cir.
2004) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (insisting that such "[s]peculative harm does not constitute
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courts routinely dismiss evaluation-based Title VII claims on the
grounds that the plaintiffs have failed to convincingly establish such
connections.187 Courts also have used the materiality standard to dismiss
discrimination claims against employers who allegedly had failed to
provide employees with human capital-enhancing mentorship and on-
the-job training.I88 In Higgins v. Gonzalez, 189 Sally Higgins, a Native
American Assistant United States Attorney, presented evidence that her
boss had failed to provide sufficient mentorship and training while
offering greater support to one of her white peers.190 Although Higgins
alleged that this treatment had prevented her from developing job-
relevant skills in a manner that "set[] her up to fail" in her career as a
federal prosecutor, 191 the court rejected Higgins's claims on the grounds
that she had failed to link this lack of mentorship to any tangible adverse
career outcomes.192 Other courts have similarly held that the failure to
adverse employment action" (quoting Aquilino v. Univ. of Kan., 268 F.3d 930, 936 (10th
Cir.2001)).
187 See, e.g., Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1241 (llth Cir. 2001) (analyzing
large body of cases from various federal courts and concluding that "criticisms of an employee's
job performance-written or oral-that do not lead to tangible job consequences will rarely
form a permissible predicate for a Title VII suit"); id. at 1243 ("Any job criticism or negative
job review carries with it the possibility that the employee's future prospects may be prejudiced
if that information is disclosed. A negative evaluation ... will rarely, if ever, become actionable
merely because the employee comes forward with evidence that his future prospects have been
or will be hindered as a result."); Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 854
(8th Cir. 2000) ("An unfavorable evaluation is actionable only where the employer
subsequently uses the evaluation as a basis to detrimentally alter the terms or conditions of the
recipient's employment."); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1996)
(unfavorable performance reviews are not, by themselves, adverse employment action). Under
this doctrinal framework, the obvious intangible consequences of discriminatory performance
evaluations-the frustration, discouragement, and demoralization-are irrelevant. See Baloch v.
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir.2008) ("[P]erformance reviews typically constitute
adverse actions only when attached to financial harms."); Tapia v. Albuquerque, 170 F. App'x
529 (10th Cir. 2006) (reprimand letter not materially adverse).
188 See, e.g., Hollimon v. Potter, 365 F. App'x 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2010); Higgins v. Gonzalez,
481 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2007). This, too, is contrary to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute.
See EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 15, supra note 149, at 46. The EEOC provides a
hypothetical example of an office in which under- performing white workers receive coaching
and support while minority workers receive less feedback and are therefore more likely to
continue to make mistakes until they are terminated. Id. The EEOC finds this to be evidence of
an unlawful termination. Id.
189 481 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031
(8th Cir. 2011).
190 Id. at 582. Higgins also alleged that her employer had subjected her to various other
forms of adverse treatment. See id. at 584-88 (holding that plaintiff's allegations of
mistreatment, which included removal from primary job, denial of "supervision, mentoring,
and training"; creation of a "shadow file" and "whisper campaign" by a superior; being
subjected to vague complaints by a superior; employer's failure to perform a mid-year
evaluation; supervisor's recommendation of termination; and eventual transfer to a different
office, neither individually nor aggregated amounted to an adverse employment action).
191 Id. at 582.
192 Id. at 585.
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provide workers equal opportunities to develop human capital through
employee training programs only rises to the level of materiality when it
affects tangible employment outcomes.193
Courts have also required employees to show that they have been
subjected to adverse employment acts in First Amendment retaliation
claims against government employers.194 In this line of cases, several
courts have found that involuntary job transfers and undesirable
changes in responsibilities were sufficiently adverse.195 Though these
cases involve different substantive claims and legal standards than those
in the employment discrimination context,196 the precedents may hold
some value for employment discrimination plaintiffs. For example, in
Dahm v. Flynn, a Title VII case, 197 the Seventh Circuit offered by way of
example that "if the duties of an assistant prosecutor were changed from
trying cases to sharpening pencils, that change would be materially
adverse."198
193 See, e.g., Hollimon, 365 F. App'x at 549 ("[A] refusal to train is not an adverse
employment action under Title VII." (citation omitted)); Rossi v. Fulton Cty., No. 1:10-CV-
4254, 2013 WL 1213205, at "13 (N.D. Ga. 2013) ("A denial of training that does not result in the
loss of some tangible job benefit does not constitute an adverse action."); Wheeler v. Chertoff,
No. C 08-1738, 2009 WL 2157548, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (refusing to find that denial of
training constituted an adverse employment action because plaintiff "made no showing that his
inability to attend such training had any material impact on the terms and conditions of his
employment"); Spencer v. AT&T Network Sys., No. 94 C7788, 1998 WL 397843, at *5 (N.D. In.
1998) ("[plaintiff] failed to present evidence that the denial of the training opportunities of
which she complains had any impact on her inability to retain her... position.").
194 See Meyers v. Neb. Health & Human Servs., 324 F.3d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2003)
(explaining the standard for establishing a First Amendment retaliation violation).
195 See, e.g., Meyers, 324 F.3d at 659-61 (transfer to position with "a considerable downward
shift in skill level" was potentially an adverse employment act); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164
F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The jury could have viewed transferring from the elite Mounted
Patrol to a teaching post at the Police Academy to be, objectively, a demotion."); Dahm v.
Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[D]ramatic downward shift in skill level required to
perform job responsibilities can rise to the level of an adverse employment action ... "); id. at
256-57 (finding that evidence presented by plaintiff that her employer had undermined her
supervisory role and reassigned all of her duties presented a triable question of fact); see also
Forsyth v. City of Dall., 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996) (in applying Texas Whistleblower
statute, court found adverse employment action where jobs "were more prestigious, had better
working hours, and were more interesting").
196 This area of law traditionally has used a more lenient adversity requirement. See Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VII's Adverse Action Requirement on First Amendment
Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech, 79 TuL. L. REv. 669,
677-87 (2005).
197 See Dahm, 60 F.3d at 253.
198 Id. at 257 n.2; see also id. at 257 (suggesting that the shift from more "intellectually
stimulating" job responsibilities to more routine ones could constitute an adverse employment
action).
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B. Incompatibility with Law Firm Associate Career Contexts
Although courts have in some rare instances found adverse
employment actions where workers have suffered reduced or unequal
opportunities to develop human capital, the plaintiffs who were able to
proceed to trial in these cases worked in occupational contexts that
differ in critical respects from those of law firm associates. This Section
will explain how certain features of law firm associate careers,
particularly the variability of associate work and both the prevalence
and importance of various informal personnel processes, serve to
obscure the existence and consequences of human capital
discrimination in ways that render it all but impossible to address under
Title VII.
As difficult as it is for plaintiffs to challenge job transfers and
reclassifications that formally alter the terms and conditions of their
employment, it is even harder to contest the types of informal
differences in assignment quality that damage the careers of law firm
associates. To understand why this is so, consider the processes through
which law firm associates are stripped of, or denied access to, work
responsibilities and opportunities. When employers in other industries
formally alter their employees' work roles and assign them to new
positions-for example, when police officers are formally stripped of
critical job duties, 199 managers officially relieved of their supervisory and
budgetary responsibilities,200 or teachers reassigned to new jobs at
different schools201-there is no ambiguity concerning how the workers'
new responsibilities will differ from those of their previous roles or
those of their colleagues.
By contrast, the process through which law firm associates are
denied access to beneficial developmental assignments or relegated to
tasks with less substantive responsibilities generally occurs subtly,
incrementally, and with less rigid certainty. As law firm associates are
essentially hired into flexible internal labor pools with ad hoc work roles
and responsibilities (according to the needs of more senior attorneys),2 2
the quality of their work assignments can fluctuate a great deal;2" 3 their
work roles are almost never definitively altered or redefined by any
single assignment. Associates are seldom stripped of existing
responsibilities; more often, they are denied access to new high-quality
199 See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
202 See generally Diaz & Dunican, supra note 1, at 975-76 (describing the informal
assignment practices used at many law firms).
203 Some interviewees, including Naomi, spoke of receiving both substantive and low-quality
assignments. Telephone Interview with Naomi, supra note 85.
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assignments that might offer them more substantive responsibilities.
Associates are not barred formally from receiving such assignments, so
it often remains possible that any disparities in access to developmental
work opportunities are simply a temporary aberration rather than a
permanent inequality.204 As the occupational role of law firm associate
encompasses both "training"205 and "paperwork,"'206 associates may
work on assignments involving significantly different levels of
sophistication and developmental value from one day to the next. An
associate who develops valuable human capital while working on a case
in which she files motions, takes depositions, and assists in strategic trial
preparations, may end up working on far more mundane document
review tasks on another case as soon as her work on the previous matter
runs its course.
Associates often only gradually end up on particular career "tracks"
at their firms.207 Those fortunate enough to develop the right
relationships or reputations of excellence end up receiving far greater
access to more valuable assignments and work responsibilities than their
classmates.208 A select group, who some associates refer to as "tapped"209
or having received "the golden treatment,"210 are eventually able to
avoid almost all lower-level assignments altogether, as their senior
colleagues come to depend on them to assist with higher-level
responsibilities.211 Consistent with the available survey data on law firm
racial and gender disparities,212 interviewees widely reported that these
"chosen" associates were disproportionately white males.
Less successful associates find themselves frozen out of these
developmental work opportunities, saddled instead with assignment
diets consisting entirely of "paperwork" not conducive to their
204 See id.
205 See Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament, supra note 1, at 1608-13 (describing
instrumentally valuable "training work").
206 See id. at 1609-10 (describing low-value "paperwork").
207 This is evident, for example, in Brad's description of the graduate process through which
some associates find that they have been relegated to strictly low-level work in their
departments. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. But see Wilkins & Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament, supra note 1, at 1651-53 (discussing certain associates who are
"seeded directly" onto their firm's "training track").
208 See generally Diaz & Dunican, supra note 1, at 975-78 (describing the importance of
relationships in providing access to assignments in both "informal" and "free market"
assignment systems).
209 Telephone Interview with Roger (Nov. 11, 2009).
210 Id.
211 In certain instances, some end up working as de facto supervisors to some of their cohort
members., for example, in supervising document review projects.
212 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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professional growth.213 Some minority and female associates have a hard
time gaining access to high quality work from the start of their careers at
these firms,214 producing immediate disparities that can eventually
harden into insurmountable deficits. To the extent that they do not
receive the same presumptions of competence as their white male
counterparts, or lack strong informal relationships with the senior
attorneys in their groups, 215 minority associates who err on early
assignments may find their access to such assignments especially short-
lived. In the worst case scenario, these associates are de facto blacklisted
and pushed out of their practice groups for shortcomings that would
have been handled more constructively-or perhaps overlooked
altogether-if committed by certain white male attorneys. Though this
de facto blacklisting produces racial disparities in human capital and
career outcomes, sometimes at greater levels than formal performance
evaluations, these informal personnel acts are exceedingly difficult to
identify, let alone challenge, under the existing Title VII framework.216
Most associates, however, have at least some possibility of receiving
more substantive work opportunities in the future. Variation in work
quality is an expected part of associate life. Even highly successful
associates who eventually go on to make partner spend significant
amounts of time "paying dues" on assignments that offer little direct
professional benefit or reward. Associates who find themselves bogged
down with an inordinate amount of grunt work in some instances
eventually gain access to higher quality assignments and opportunities
that provide them with the human and reputational capital to either
advance with their colleagues or eventually transition to desirable
external positions. This fluidity in their roles makes it difficult to
determine whether an individual associate has in fact been deprived of
equal access to human capital or functionally relegated to a less desirable
213 See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament, supra note 1, at 1611-13
(discussing the predicament of "paperwork attorneys" who do not substantive work
assignments); supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
215 Several interviewees reported these dynamics as contributing to racial inequality in their
firms. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Brad, supra note 76 (alleging that black associates
have to work to overcome white partners' negative biases toward them); Telephone Interview
with Langston, supra note 96 (reporting that black associates in his group were disadvantaged
by their lack of relationships with influential attorneys).
216 Associates lack access to the informal word-of-mouth between partners concerning
themselves or other associates and would have great difficulty directly connecting them to
tangible employment outcomes. Even if it were possible to draw such connections, the
deference that courts show to employers in positions requiring subjective assessments of
performance and career-relevant traits would still present virtually insurmountable hurdles for
law firm associates seeking to advance Title VII challenges to their performance assessments.
See Nancy Levit, Lawyers Suing Law Firms: The Limits on Attorney Employment Discrimination
Claims and the Prospects for Creating Happy Lawyers, 73 U. PITt. L. REV. 65, 79 (2011).
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occupational position, and nearly impossible to determine if such
actions occurred on the basis of race.
Given these occupational features, and the restrictive adverse
employment action requirement of the existing Title VII jurisprudence,
black associates will often face great difficulty in attempting to establish
that they have been treated more harshly than white counterparts.
Making headway against BigLaw's human capital discrimination
problem therefore requires ambitious doctrinal innovations and new
efforts on the part of law firm employers.
IV. POTENTIAL DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS
Although the processes of human capital discrimination addressed
in this Article largely fall outside the scope of Title VII's coverage, this
Part will briefly identify a number of potential collaborative steps that
courts, law firms, and other interested parties can take to better protect
minority associates from these career-debilitating inequalities.
A. Doctrinal Reforms
1. A More Sensible Adverse Employment Action Doctrine
If in the interests of judicial efficiency and fairness to employers217
courts insist on retaining the adverse employment action doctrine, they
must recognize the denial of equal opportunities to develop human
capital as a mode of discrimination that materially and adversely alters
the terms and conditions of employment for law firm associates. As this
Article has demonstrated, the racially inequitable allocation of work
assignments within large law firms deprives high-potential black
attorneys of valuable professional skills,218 handicaps them in their
efforts to compete for partnership,219 exacts damaging psychological and
217 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. It is worth noting though that several scholars
have called for the judiciary to dramatically curtail or abandon this doctrine altogether. See, e.g.,
Lidge, supra note 149, at 336 (arguing that the requirement "is not justified by the statutory
language, Supreme Court decisions, legislative history, or sound policy"); id. at 400-01 (noting
that the vagueness of the standard requires courts to use subjective judgment with minimal
guidance or standards); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J.
1121, 1151 (1998) (arguing that this entire jurisprudential framework misapplies the language
of Title VII's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" requirement, which is "better
read as making clear that an employer who discriminates against an employee in a non-job-
related context would not run afoul of Title VII, rather than as sheltering employment
discrimination that does not significantly disadvantage an employee" (footnote omitted)).
218 See supra Section II.C.
219 See supra Section II.D.
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dignitary harms,220 and presents unfair burdens and obstacles for even
some of the most successful black attorneys. 221 In instances where
human capital discrimination is not directly or obviously linked to
tangible employment outcomes, it remains a critical mechanism of
racial inequality that limits and derails the careers of black attorneys.
When minority associates receive demonstrably less substantive work
opportunities than their white counterparts under conditions that raise
the inference of racially disparate treatment, 222 those who are willing to
pursue disparate treatment actions against their employers should be
deemed to have raised triable questions of fact. Such a doctrinal
improvement would potentially provide legal recourse for a far greater
number of disadvantaged black associates (and perhaps workers in
other human capital intensive occupations) and would provide greater
incentives for employers to implement organizational reforms designed
to address these problems.
As a practical matter, however, even this important jurisprudential
change would likely produce only modest results, for a number of
reasons. First, many black associates would still face considerable
difficulties in establishing that the white associates who received greater
opportunities to develop human capital were in all relevant respects
similarly situated to them. In employment contexts such as those of
large law firms, where personnel decisions and evaluations are
necessarily discretionary and highly subjective, employers should have
little difficulty in distinguishing between different workers on
performance and other non-racial grounds. Further, even when black
associates are able to establish prima facie cases of racial discrimination
and proceed to trial, most law firms likely would have very little
difficulty meeting their burden of production in offering alternative
race-neutral explanations for the racial disparities in treatment. Finally,
and partly reflecting these challenges, very few black associates are likely
to sue their law firm employers for such ambiguous mistreatment. Even
black associates with triable claims will likely fear being stigmatized in
ways that limit their future employment prospects.
220 See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
222 Plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of racial intent generally must demonstrate that the
white counterparts who were treated better than them were in all respects similarly situated. See
Smith v. Stratus Comput., Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1994). This is often a difficult burden,
and thus constitutes an important limiting requirement that would still prevent every
disgruntled minority associate from proceeding to trial with their claims, even if courts were to
recognize human capital discrimination as an adverse employment action.
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2. An Employer Duty of Care Standard
As I have argued elsewhere,223 effectively addressing the ongoing
problems of institutional discrimination in law firms and other
contemporary workplaces may require a far more ambitious
reconceptualization of Title VII, one that replaces the current individual
justice model with a more expansive regulatory model that places an
affirmative duty on employers to avoid unnecessarily reproducing racial
hierarchy. As articulated by antidiscrimination scholars including, most
notably, Richard Thompson Ford,224 such an approach could require
employers to implement best practices approaches approved by
researchers, experts, and judges.225 Under this new jurisprudential
framework, employers who fail to meet such standards would face
potential liability to minority employees, while those who do meet such
standards would be able to avoid liability and potentially costly
litigation.226 Such an expansive reorientation of Title VII would provide
a potential avenue of relief for black associates who suffer racially
disparate experiences and outcomes that they are unable to link to
particular decision-makers and employment acts. Given the difficulty of
knowing, let alone proving, whether particular experiences are
motivated by impermissible racial intent or materially affect an
associate's future career trajectory, this shifting of the burden onto
employers could facilitate real progress for the many black associates
who would otherwise have no recourse at all.
B. Employer Initiatives
Regardless of whether courts are willing to undertake such an
ambitious revision of Title VII, sustained progress for black law firm
223 See Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, supra note 8.
224 See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2014) (arguing that antidiscrimination law should require
employers "to meet a duty of care to avoid unnecessarily perpetuating social segregation or
hierarchy"); see also Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 6, at 94
(proposing a new Title VII approach that would "place an affirmative obligation on employers
to manage diversity within their institutions to minimize the operation of discriminatory bias");
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 900 (1993)
(advancing a theory of negligent discrimination in which an employer would be found liable
"when the employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it knows or
should know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to occur").
225 See Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, supra note 8.
226 Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights After the Second Reconstruction, 123 YALE
L.J. 2942, 2959 (2014) ("An employer who fails to meet the duty should be punished in some




associates will require collaborative efforts between law firms, partners,
clients, and other industry constituents interested in racial progress. The
qualitative data from my interviews particularly calls attention to the
need for earlier interventions and proactive preventative measures
designed to ensure that the most junior minority associates are not left
behind before their careers even begin. Given the cumulative and often
intangible harms brought about by human capital discrimination,227
there is little reason to believe that later corrective measures will ever
effectively undo the professional damage suffered by its victims.
In an earlier Article on racial disadvantage in corporate law
firms,228 I introduced several policies and practices that might help in
this respect. To address this problem most directly, firms should
consider developing special assignment programs that would ensure
that black associates receive access to more equitable shares of premium
work opportunities. 229 More generally, employers should strive to
implement management cultures that place a greater emphasis on fully
developing, properly utilizing, and accurately evaluating the talent of all
junior workers.230 Although formal mentorship programs have had
mixed results in improving racial diversity,231 firms should deepen their
commitments to such programming in order to further bridge the social
capital gap between black and white workers.232 Mentors can enhance
black associates' human capital by providing them with informal
training in the form of constructive criticism, useful feedback, and
advice concerning their work product. Mentorship relationships
provide junior workers guidance that enables them to better meet the
227 See supra Section II.D.
228 Woodson, Race and Rapport, supra note 2.
229 See id. at 2573.
230 See id. at 2571.
231 Organizational researchers have found that formal programs, where mentees are assigned
to individual mentors, may be less effective than mentorship relationships that develop
informally. See Belle Rose Ragins & John L. Cotton, Mentor Functions and Outcomes: A
Comparison of Men and Women in Formal and Informal Mentoring Relationships, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 529, 540-44 (1999) (finding that workers perceive organic mentorship to be
more effective than formal mentoring relationships). This may not be a fair comparison,
however, as the ability of individual workers to develop mentors independently of formal
programs may in some instances reflect aptitudes and characteristics relevant to work
performance and career success. In other words, this may reflect some selection effect, wherein
the individuals who found mentors organically would have outperformed their mentorless
colleagues even in the absence of their mentorship relationships. See id. at 544 (providing this
disclaimer).
232 See Woodson, Race and Rapport, supra note 2, at 2572-73 (discussing the potential value
of more meaningful, comprehensive mentorship efforts); see also Alexandra Kalev et al., Best
Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity
Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 590 (2006) (finding that formal mentorship produced
significant career gains for black and white women).
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technical demands and informal expectations of their jobs.233 This type
of on-the-job tutoring can prove invaluable in helping associates to
maximize their performance on work assignments and thereby positions
them for further high-quality assignments in the future. To pursue these
strategies effectively, firms will need to put in place the diversity
infrastructure necessary to monitor, measure, and investigate
employment practices and progress.
One collaborative approach, that employers truly committed to
making progress on this front could pursue, entails collecting more fine-
grained data concerning the quality of work assignments received by
their associates as well as making this data more readily available to
clients and various industry observers. This information would be far
more useful than the current population statistics used in existing
diversity rating systems, and more consistent and comprehensive than
the information occasionally sought by particular corporate clients.234 If
sufficiently transparent and available, such record keeping would
provide extraordinary incentives for firms to pay far closer attention to,
and more proactively attend to, the human capital opportunities of their
minority associates.
These reforms will by no means eradicate the problem of human
capital discrimination, particularly without a more expansive
conceptualization of Title VII. Even the firms most fully committed to
racial diversity and fairness will not be able to wholly prevent individual
partners and senior associates from treating minority associates with
greater scrutiny or interpreting their performance less generously than
their white counterparts. These forms of disparate treatment, whether
driven by implicit bias or other subtle social tendencies, may function as
asymptotic limits to the progress that firms can achieve in this realm.
Nonetheless, they represent viable means of securing greater racial
equitableness than existing practices currently allow.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of empirical insights from interviews of a sample of
black law firm associates, this Article has sought to refine the existing
understanding of the nature of racial inequality in large law firms by
233 See, e.g., Payne-Pikus et al., supra note 44 (finding that racial disparities in black and
white associates' relationships with partners were associated with racial disparities in various
career outcomes); Terri A. Scandura, Mentorship and Career Mobility: An Empirical
Investigation, 13 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 169 (1992) (finding that mentorship was related
to workers' salary and promotions); Scott E. Seibert et al., A Social Capital Theory of Career
Success, 44 AM. MGMT. J. 219, 232 (2001) (finding that "people with whom one has a strong
relationship are likely to provide one with more information and assistance").
234 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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calling attention to human capital discrimination as a major
impediment to the career prospects of black law firm associates, both
within their firms and elsewhere. In doing so, it has contributed to an
important body of legal scholarship that seeks to illuminate and
challenge contemporary forms of institutional discrimination that
continue to disadvantage racial minorities and female workers in white
male dominated workplaces. Addressing human capital discrimination
will require ambitious doctrinal reforms and resource-intensive
employer efforts. Although firms already devote significant resources
toward improving racial diversity and fairness, further progress toward
the important goal of finally providing talented black attorneys greater
opportunities of forging successful careers will demand even more
commitment on the part of employers, clients, and other industry
intermediaries. While this Article has focused specifically on the
experiences of black law firm associates, its insights also potentially
apply both to law firm associates from other disadvantaged social
identity groups and to black workers in other occupational contexts.
Future scholarship could further flesh out the nature of human capital
discrimination more broadly by attending to the experiences of the
members of other such disadvantaged and marginalized groups.
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